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5 
Problems and Recommendations 
Russian Energy Policies Revisited 
Assessing the Impact of the Crisis in Ukraine 
on Russian Energy Policies and Specifying the 
Implications for German and EU Energy Policies 
The structural changes made in the Russian energy 
sector have been significant and have an impact on 
European Union (EU) energy markets. Russia is – and 
will remain – the EU’s major supplier for oil, natural 
gas and coal at least for the next decade. An analysis of 
Russian energy policies after the annexation of Crimea 
and the destabilisation in eastern Ukraine offers im-
portant insights with respect to the economic and geo-
political repercussions. 
Russian domestic changes are manifold: Gazprom 
has a surplus of natural gas production capacity and is 
looking at new markets. Competition is getting fierce 
between Gazprom, Rosneft and Novatek. Gazprom will 
maintain its key role as a supplier to the EU because of 
existing long-term contracts that extend beyond 2025 
and its ability to supply gas at low cost. Oil production 
and exports in Russia are at historically high levels, but 
the old fields are being depleted. Western sanctions 
pre-empt Russia from quickly opening new frontiers 
in offshore Arctic, tight and shale formations. Mod-
ernisation in the refinery sector is slowing. Reforms 
and restructuring in the electricity sector have lost 
speed or have even been reversed. Then-President 
Dmitri Medvedev’s reform slogans of “modernisation” 
have disappeared from the Russian political agenda. 
The Russian energy system is also under stress because 
it has to adapt to a rapidly changing energy landscape. 
These new dynamics arise from the growing demand 
beyond Western industrialised countries, in particular 
in Asia, as well as from the shale oil and shale gas 
revolution in the United States. Oil price develop-
ments and relatively low energy prices have an impact 
on future production and export projects. Growing 
competition among exporters over market shares is 
putting pressure on Russian oil and gas rents. With 
respect to exports, Russia has been slowly diversifying 
to the Pacific for oil and natural gas. Yet, structural 
changes have moved beyond mere reactions to shale 
developments in North America and shifting trade 
flows to the Pacific – they have been reinforced by the 
(geo)politics that have unfolded following the crisis in 
Ukraine and the subsequent deterioration in EU-
Russian relations. 
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The “povorot na vostok” (pivot to the east) has gained 
momentum through these geopolitics, but it has also 
been narrowed to export and pipeline deals with China. 
Recent gas and oil contracts with China will gradually 
allow Russia to diversify its energy portfolio and de-
crease its dependency on the European market. The 
sanctions will most likely reinforce this trend and 
exert an influence at the commercial level as well. The 
fact that Russia is increasingly selling stakes in pro-
ducing fields and infrastructure, equity shares in com-
panies as well as agreeing on future hydrocarbon 
supplies for credits will gradually strengthen the ties 
with Asia. This will limit and harm business opportu-
nities of Western companies in the future. Moreover, 
these developing alliances between state companies 
across the whole value chain pave the road of state-
dominated “mercantilist” approaches to energy trade. 
A common trend for all three sectors (natural gas, oil, 
electricity) is the growing role of Asian companies, 
in particular Chinese companies – something that 
became visible starting in mid-2015. The real impacts 
on the EU will be felt after five years, or perhaps even 
a decade, because of the long lead-times of energy 
projects. With regards to geo-economics, Russia’s pivot 
to Asia will persist because it coincides, for example, 
with the gasification of the East, the shifting new fron-
tiers in production and the targeting of Asian mar-
kets, which promise growth for demand. 
Yet, since mid-2015 economic rationality has been 
returning to EU-Russian energy relations. Even though 
sanctions will be kept in place till January 31, 2016, 
and their prolongation depends on the implementa-
tion of the Minsk II process, revitalising commercial 
ties is indispensable with regards to energy. Against 
the background of the security crisis in Eastern Europe, 
it is not a given that this energy relationship will 
contribute (as compared to the past) to confidence and 
peace-building. The rapid deterioration of the political 
relationship over energy between the EU and Russia 
should serve as a warning before future steps are 
taken. A deterioration here will certainly have nega-
tive spillover effects on foreign and security relations. 
The two partners are gradually moving towards other 
suppliers and markets. This “divorce” comes during an 
ongoing transformation of the global, EU and Russian 
markets as well as the transition towards a more 
sustainable energy mix in Germany and the EU. This 
creates a sensitive combination of mistrust, misper-
ceptions and misunderstandings, which carry the risk 
of creating disputes in energy relations that might be 
carried into other political areas. A failure of commer-
cial ventures can send shocks far beyond the respective 
business case. Thus, the EU-Russian energy relation-
ship requires attention, but it must be viewed through 
something other than a geopolitical lens. 
The immediate advice is to reinforce dialogue on 
the working and technical levels. This is recommend-
able in order to hedge against risks and to oversee a 
smooth continuation of energy trade and business 
transactions. Then, five recommendations can be made: 
1) be aware of negative spillover effects if energy rela-
tions deteriorate; 2) normalise energy relations with 
Russia and ground them on sound commercial proj-
ects; 3) aim at a de-securitisation of energy relations 
in the political framing and detach the EU’s energy 
policy narratives and imperatives from the fixation 
on Russia; 4) envision a common energy future and 
a common energy space; and finally 5) re-engage in 
energy diplomacy in the wider region. The EU and 
Russia do not have to start from scratch: The Roadmap 
for EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 – en-
dorsed by the EU and Russia in 2013 – is a good start-
ing point to re-envision a common energy future and 
to rebuild a sustainable and future-orientated energy 
partnership. 
Certainly, balancing diverse perceptions in the EU 
remains a challenge for Germany. The energy relation-
ship with Russia touches upon two major cleavages in 
the EU and among member states where no consensus 
on the way forward exists: Russia and energy policies. 
Yet, moving away from Russia as a supplier will be 
costly, and thus impact on relative energy price differ-
ences with North America and China to the disadvant-
age of the EU. These trade-offs have to be taken expli-
citly into consideration. Subsequently, it is important 
to reframe energy relations with Russia. The Energy 
Union should not be defined in opposition to Russia 
but rather be more inclusive and realistic in approach. 
The Energy Union is decisive for strengthening inter-
nal market integration and transitioning towards a 
sustainable energy mix. More energy diplomacy will 
be needed to support any diversification and also 
manage persisting interdependence with Russia. 
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Setting the Scene – Russian Energy Policies and the 
Relationship with the EU 
 
Russian Energy Relations with Germany and 
the EU under Revision 
The EU-Russian bilateral energy relationship has been 
influenced by the geopolitical crisis in and around 
Ukraine since 2014.1 The annexation of Crimea by 
Russia in March 2014 and the military destabilisation 
in eastern Ukraine have resulted in a securitisation 
of energy relations. Energy relations have become an 
issue of high politics. The official energy dialogue 
between the EU and Russia has been suspended, with 
the exception of the trilateral talks between Russia, 
the EU and Ukraine to secure natural gas supplies to 
Ukraine. EU sanctions also target specific Russian oil 
companies, Russian Arctic offshore oil exploration 
and shale oil production. 
Yet, EU and Russian energy policies have been drift-
ing apart and have become more complicated, even 
prior to the crisis in and around Ukraine. The Internal 
Energy Market Packages of the EU2 signalled a rupture 
of long-standing, traditional (contractual) relation-
ships because they ended bundled business models 
 
1  The authors would like to thank Tatiana Mitrova, Maria 
Belova, Susan Stewart and Alexander Libman for their highly 
valued and extremely useful comments on draft versions of the 
text. We also thank Benjamin Gaiser and Maria Pastukhova for 
their assistance in editing the research paper. 
2  The Internal Energy Market Reforms – the Directive 1998 (Direc-
tive 98/30/EC), the Internal Energy Market Package 2003 (Directive 
2003/55/EC) and 2009 (2009/73/EC) – are intended to create a new 
order and establish a liberalised, competitive, well-functioning 
and integrated EU gas market. With the Third Package, regula-
tion has been reinforced by ownership-unbundling as the pre-
ferred model; antitrust enforcement; the abolishment of desti-
nation clauses in long-term contracts; access tariffs and network 
codes; and favours short-term dealings (see in more detail: Kim 
Talus, “United States Natural Gas Markets, Contracts and Risks: 
What Lessons for the European Union and Asia Pacific Natural 
Gas Markets?”, Energy Policy 74 [2014], 28–34). With the Lisbon 
Treaty of 2009 (Art. 194), energy security (and in particular secu-
rity of supply) became a field of shared competencies, requiring 
coordination among the Union and its member states. The shift 
from state-regulation and monopoly power to markets and con-
tracts is profound (ibid.) and changes the underlying organisa-
tional structures in the gas market industry. 
and initiated the revision of long-term contracts.3 In 
particular, the implementation of the Third Internal 
Energy Market Package (hereafter: Third Energy 
Package) since 2009 has resulted in disenchantment 
between the EU and Russia. The EU has (unilaterally) 
changed the market and business environment. As a 
consequence, the energy markets of the EU and Russia 
have developed in different directions: Russia remained 
a state-dominated “market”, and companies even ex-
perienced a reinforcement of ties to the political elite; 
the EU moved towards a neoliberal competitive and 
integrated internal market. As a consequence, the com-
mon space has become more fragmented. The transi-
tory character of German and EU energy policies to-
wards a more sustainable energy system – for example 
with the German “Energiewende” – adds to growing 
uncertainties, because the demand for fossil fuels is 
very difficult to predict. 
The political clash over Ukraine is impeding the 
EU and Russia from finding solutions for contentious 
issues. These contentious issues have had an impact on 
the energy relationship, even prior to crisis in Ukraine, 
for example: the Commission’s Antitrust Case against 
Gazprom (see the chapter on natural gas); the arbi-
tration procedure by the former foreign shareholders 
of Yukos and the verdict against Russia4; as well as 
conflicts over bundled infrastructure projects such as 
the OPAL (Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung) pipeline 
and the planned South Stream pipeline (see gas chap-
ter). Containing these conflicts is becoming more dif-
ficult because of the deterioration in political relations 
regarding energy. There is a potential for further esca-
lations in energy trade relations, which would have 
negative consequences on the overall relationship. 
 
3  See in more detail: Kirsten Westphal, “Institutional Change in 
European Natural Gas Markets and Implications for Energy Securi-
ty: Lessons from the German Case”, Energy Policy 74 (2014), 35–43. 
4  The foreign shareholders of YUKOS filed several arbitration 
cases against the Russian state for the compensation expropria-
tion under the Energy Charter Treaty. The Court in The Hague 
ruled against Russia to award US$50 billion to the shareholders. 
Neil Buckley and Kathrin Hille, Retrieved Yukos shareholders 
face battle to claim $50bn. Financial Times, 28 July 2014, http:// 
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b01cfb72-1669-11e4-8210-00144feabdc0.html 
#ixzz3AwOzaRYE (accessed 10 November 2015). 
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This is all taking place against the backdrop of a 
rapidly changing energy landscape. The shale gas revo-
lution and the light tight oil revolution in the United 
States is putting pressure on traditional suppliers 
and affecting the strategies, the position and the role 
of Russian companies. Global energy markets have 
changed tremendously with demand centres shifting 
to the Pacific. Between July 2014 and July 2015, oil 
prices have almost halved due to less rapid growth in 
China, Eurozone financial crises and increased fossil 
fuel (over)supply world-wide. Traditional suppliers 
have to adapt to this downward swing in the cycle. 
With the nuclear deal concluded, Iran might come 
back and cut into Russia’s European market shares 
in the mid- to long term for natural gas, and maybe 
much sooner for crude oil. Russia (as well as other) 
producers face dwindling resource rents and decreas-
ing earnings for the state budget. This is all adding to 
the uncertainty and instability within the bilateral 
energy relationship. 
To summarise, the EU and Russia are – for their 
part – revisiting the energy relationship, not only with 
respect to the future, but increasingly with respect to 
present trade relations and vulnerabilities. The most 
visible sign is the EU’s Energy Union, which is one 
priority of the Juncker Commission and directed to 
ensure energy security, trust and solidarity among the 
member states. Yet, Russia has reviewed its engage-
ment (and exposure to risks) in Europe, too. 
This paper explores Russian energy policies between 
2009 and 2015 to not only understand the factors and 
strategies driving them but also to gain a better under-
standing of Russian energy politics and economics. 
It is presumed that Russia will remain an important 
energy supplier for the EU and that the energy rela-
tionship can serve as a future link to restore trust and 
confidence – depending on the course of the conflict 
in Ukraine. Moreover, whatever options the future 
offers, a reformulation of policies vis-à-vis Russia will 
be necessary, but a better understanding of Russian 
energy policies is a necessary precondition. Russia’s 
approach also has a wider geographical impact 
because integration efforts within the Eurasian Eco-
nomic Union, consisting of Armenia, Belarus, Kazakh-
stan, Kyrgyzstan and Russia, exist in all energy sectors. 
Qualifying the EU-Russian Energy 
Relationship and Quantifying Energy Trade 
Against the background of the annexation of Crimea 
and the situation in the Eastern parts of Ukraine, 
Germany and other EU member states face a dilemma 
between political principles and economic interests. 
On the one hand, the pure commercial, geographic 
and geological facts still persist, resulting in inter-
dependence: the proximity of Russian energy sources, 
existing and planned infrastructure as well as the 
complementarity of Russia’s resource abundance and 
the EU’s import dependence on fossil fuels. On the 
other hand, these functional logics of complementarity 
and interdependence are undermined by Russia’s 
course in Ukraine. 
Thus, it is increasingly difficult to make an assess-
ment of Russian energy policies through the prism 
of German and EU interests. This is all the more true 
because there is a wide gap between the perceptions of 
commercial players on the one hand and the political 
elites on the other hand with respect to Russia’s reli-
ability as an energy supplier. Whereas the former refer 
to complementary interests and functioning trade, the 
latter judge the relationship through a geopolitical 
lens. To base our analysis on solid ground, we decided 
to take the 2013 Roadmap for EU-Russia Energy Co-
operation until 20505 as a reference point. Russia and 
the EU had confirmed this Roadmap on the basis of 
their energy strategies and with regard to existing 
energy ties and future relations some months prior 
to the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine. 
In the Roadmap for EU-Russia Energy Cooperation 
until 2050, both outline the political significance and 
the economic relevance of energy relations, which 
have always been perceived as having the “most poten-
tial to lead the European subcontinent into deeper, 
mutually beneficial integration”.6 The document con-
tains chapters on electricity, gas, oil, renewables and 
energy efficiency plus cooperation regarding energy 
scenarios and forecasts. Therefore, both partners em-
phasise the long-term dimension of an albeit trans-
forming partnership, as energy markets have become 
more globalised, the EU is aiming towards a low-
carbon energy system and the Russian Federation is 
“on path of an innovative and efficient energy sector 
 
5  European Commission (EC), Roadmap: EU-Russia Energy Coopera-
tion until 2050, March 2013, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/ 
files/documents/2013_03_eu_russia_roadmap_2050_signed.pdf 
(accessed 28 November 2014). 
6  Ibid., 3. 
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development”.7 Cross-sectoral issues of common inter-
est and activities are energy-demand developments, 
price volatility, climate challenge, and the Roadmap 
vision to deepen and intensify energy cooperation, 
with steps to be taken by 2020, 2030 and 2050. The 
strategic target identified in the paper is a Pan-Euro-
pean Energy Space. This underlines Russia’s outsized 
role for the continent’s energy supply. 
Quantifying Russia’s position in the energy land-
scape is straightforward: Russia is – and will remain – 
among the biggest energy exporters in the world. It 
produces 12.7 per cent of the world’s oil, 16.7 per cent 
of its gas and 4.3 per cent of its coal.8 Accordingly, Rus-
sia is the most important energy supplier to the EU, 
with 35 per cent of its oil, 30 per cent of its gas and 26 
per cent of its coal imports originating from Russia.9 
Last but not least, Russia’s share of EU uranium sup-
plies accounted for 18 per cent10 and uranium enrich-
ment services for 25 per cent.11 This is of strategic rele-
vance given the fact that the replacement of specific 
fuel rods cannot easily be realised. The EU is also the 
major destination for Russian energy exports: Russia 
exports two-thirds of its oil, more than 50 per cent of 
its gas and almost 50 per cent of its coal to the EU.12 
Even though the close energy relationship between 
Germany/the EU and Russia stretches beyond natural 
gas to oil, hard coal, the nuclear fuel cycle and the 
power sector, EU-Russian gas relations receive most of 
the political and public attention. EU’s gas supply is 
more than 80 per cent pipeline-bound, thereby creat-
ing much closer and more rigid (inter-) dependencies. 
In contrast, crude oil and hard coal are traded glob-
ally. Electricity cooperation overall is a special area, 
decisive for the modernisation of the network and 
generation capacities – as related to renewables and 
 
7  Ibid. 
8  BP, Statistical Review of World Energy 2015 (London: BP), 10, 24 
and 32. 
9  European Union (EU) Statistical Pocketbook, 2013, 24. 
10  “Purchase of Natural Uranium by EU Utilities by Origin in 
1992–2014”, European Commission, Nuclear Observatory, http:// 
ec.europa.eu/euratom/observatory_data.html (accessed 16 Sep-
tember 2015). 
11  “Providers of Enrichment Services Delivered to EU Utilities 
in 1993–2014”, European Commission, Nuclear Observatory, 
http://ec.europa.eu/euratom/observatory_data.html (accessed 
16 September 2015). 
12  Alexander Novak and Guenther Oettinger, “E’nergodialog 
Rossiya-ES 13j obobshhayushhij doklad” [“13th EU-Russia Joint 
Energy Report”], January 2014, http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/ 
iblock/ece/ecef70b71b1fe04742545dcd647ca0fa.pdf (accessed 
19 December 2014). 
energy efficiency – but has received much less public 
attention. Linked to that, nuclear energy is a specific 
and highly sensitive topic. 
This research paper focusses on natural gas because 
of its historical relevance as part of the rapproche-
ment and détente during the Cold War and the geo-
political attention attached to it. The paper also looks 
at oil because it is still the primary source of energy 
in the EU. Moreover, Russia, as stated in the common 
Roadmap, is a stable supplier compared to the Middle 
East and North Africa.13 Another section of the paper 
is devoted to electricity, which is a very particular 
field of cooperation. Taking the power sector into the 
picture seems appropriate because average electricity 
demand is growing more than demand for other 
energy sources,14 and the sector plays a key role for 
sector innovation and decarbonisation. 
 
 
 
13  Ibid., 17. 
14  Ibid., 6. 
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Mapping the Russian Energy Sector and Energy Politics 
 
Systemic Relevance of the Sector 
The energy sector is of systemic relevance for the Rus-
sian economy and Russian politics.15 The energy trade 
is one of the major income sources for the Russian 
budget, with shares of 50 per cent in 201316 and 2014.17 
The revenues from taxation and export duties are also 
feeding the two Russian state funds: the Reserve Fund, 
consisting of US$72.93 billion (an equivalent of 5.9 
per cent of gross domestic product [GDP]),18 and the 
National Wealth Fund (US$74.56 billion – 6 per cent 
of GDP,19 as of August 1, 2015). The share of energy 
products in exports was almost 88 per cent in 2014.20 
The Russian state budget, which has seen ever-higher 
 
15  See in more detail: Tatiana Mitrova, “The Political and Eco-
nomic Importance of Gas in Russia”, in The Russian Gas Matrix: 
How Markets Are Driving Change, ed. James Henderson and Simon 
Pirani (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 6–38. 
16  “Predvaritel’naya oczenka ispolnitel’nogo federal’nogo byud-
zheta za yanvar’-dekabr’ 2013 goda” [“Preliminary Assessment 
of the Federal Budget Execution in January–December 2013”], 
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, http://www. 
minfin.ru/ru/document/index.php?id_4=20821 (accessed 21 Au-
gust 2015). 
17  “Predvaritel’naya oczenka ispolnitel’nogo federal’nogo byud-
zheta za yanvar’-dekabr’ 2014 goda” [“Preliminary Assessment 
of the Federal Budget Execution in January–December 2014”], 
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, http://www. 
minfin.ru/ru/press-center/?id_4=33050 (accessed 21 August 2015). 
18  Reserve Fund of Russia is mostly used to cover budget deficit. 
On 1 August 2015 the Reserve Fund accounted for US$72.93 bil-
lion, according to the Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federa-
tion, http://old.minfin.ru/en/reservefund/statistics/amount/ 
index.php?id_4=5817 (accessed 20 August 2015). 
19  The main function of the National Wealth Fund is to support 
the Russian pension system. On 1 August 2015 the National 
Wealth Fund accounted for US$74.56 billion according to the 
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, http://old.minfin. 
ru/en/nationalwealthfund/statistics/amount/index.php?id_4= 
5830 (accessed 20 August 2015). 
20  Total export of goods in 2014 accounted for US$496.944 bil-
lion. Energy products accounted for US$435.286 billion. Energy 
products comprise coal, coke, crude oil, oil products, gasoline, 
diesel, liquid fuels, LNG, natural gas and, electricity. “E’ksport 
Rossii vazhnejshix tovarov v yanvare-dekabre 2014” [“Export of 
the Most Important Goods from Russia in January–December 
2014”], Federal Customs Service, http://www.customs.ru/index2. 
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=20493:-2014&catid= 
52:2011-01-24-16-28-57&Itemid=1976 (accessed 21 August 2015). 
break-even oil prices, has been hit by the oil price 
slump that began in summer 2014. The fiscal break-
even point for the Russian budget in 2015 was re-
ported to be around US$100 per barrel in the winter 
of 2014/2015. Yet, the fiscal break-even point changes 
with the devaluation of the Russian currency, as 
spending is calculated in roubles. 
President Vladimir Putin has also used the energy 
sector as an instrument for his preservation of power. 
The “old system of oligarchs”, which had dominated 
the oil industry in the 1990s under then-President 
Boris Yeltsin, has been substituted by a web of “loyal-
ists” to President Putin. The present “network state 
capitalism”21 is controlled closely by the Kremlin and 
builds upon the personal ties of President Putin. The 
big companies are managed by Putin “loyalists” and 
have served as a funding source to subsidise other 
economic activities of this circle that is close to the 
leadership. On the one hand, this network of loyalists 
has been of strategic relevance for Putin’s politics and 
Russian economics. On the other hand, major com-
panies have branched out beyond their traditional sec-
tors, for example the electricity sector. Thus, the inter-
play and competition between companies has become 
an important factor and has to be taken into consider-
ation to understand commercial, economic and also 
political rationales behind Russian energy policies. 
Gazprom, Rosneft & Co. and Russia’s network 
state capitalism 
The major players that are active across different sec-
tors of the Russian energy industry are Gazprom and 
Rosneft. Gazprom has long been seen as a state within 
a state. Its management board has been closely inter-
twined with the Kremlin. It served as a means for guar-
anteeing low energy prices for private households and 
was a major source of spending in remote areas, in 
marginalised regions and for supplying industry. Till 
 
21  Jonas Grätz, “Russia’s Multinationals: Network State Capital-
ism Goes Global”, in Multinational Corporations from Emerging Mar-
kets: State Capitalism 3.0, ed. Andreas Nölke (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2014), 90–108. 
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the early 2000s, domestic gas prices were below mar-
ginal production costs, subsidised by export revenues. 
This traditional scheme of cross-subsidisation of do-
mestic gas sales by Russian long-term gas exports 
(which included the obligation to hold certain amounts 
of gas available for export) came to an end in the first 
decade of this millennium. Since then, Gazprom’s 
extraordinary position has been changing profoundly: 
2009 was a turning point as Gazprom reported break-
ing even in its domestic business for the first time and 
being in the black. This was logically accompanied by 
the state’s aim to attain more information about Gaz-
prom’s production costs and pricing. Parallel to domes-
tic price, taxes increased, too. The company was in-
creasingly viewed as a source of additional income 
for the state.22 Gazprom has been burdened with the 
gasification project of eastern Siberia and the Russian 
Far East, and tasked with connecting new fields to the 
Russian gas pipeline network, the United Gas Supply 
System (UGSS). Gazprom is increasingly being subject-
ed to Russian policies. Gazprom’s CEO, Alexei Miller, is 
a former staff member of Vladimir Putin who became 
Vice-Mayor of St. Petersburg. Miller took over from the 
old management of Rem Vyachirev in 2001 and con-
solidated Gazprom’s assets in the gas industry. Gaz-
prom has come under pressure from competitors. The 
Russian state has strategic holdings of more than 50 
per cent in Gazprom shares.23 
Gazprom is in fierce competition with Rosneft 
regarding holding the leading position in Russian oil 
and gas industries, exports, and (in)direct support 
from the state. Rosneft is much more an “Asian” com-
pany with a strong production base in eastern Siberia 
and the Far East as well as close ties to Chinese and 
Indian companies, whereas Gazprom is traditionally 
linked to Europe. This race has strong implications 
for the future of Russian foreign (energy) trade and 
policies. The state’s share of 69.5 per cent of Rosneft is 
held through Rosneftegas, which is 100 per cent state-
owned. The British company BP owns another 19.75 
per cent.24 There are discussions about selling another 
19.75 per cent share, to be offered to e.g. Chinese com-
panies in light of the difficult financial situation. Igor 
 
22  Mitrova, “The Political and Economic Importance of Gas” 
(see note 15), 20–22. 
23  Gazprom, OAO Gazprom Annual Report 2014. The Power of Growth, 
128, http://www.gazprom.com/f/posts/55/477129/gazprom-
annual-report-2014-en.pdf (accessed 22 October 2015). 
24  Rosneft, Victory, Effectiveness, Responsibility. Annual Report 2014, 
54, http://www.rosneft.com/attach/0/58/80/a_report_2014_eng.pdf 
(accessed 20 July 2015). 
Sechin, the president of Rosneft since 2012 and the 
chairman of the board of directors from 2004 until 
2011, had been deputy head of the executive office 
under Russian presidents Putin and Medvedev from 
2000 until 2008. Like President Putin and Gazprom’s 
Miller, Sechin also comes from St. Petersburg.25 Sechin 
is also head of the Presidential Commission for Stra-
tegic Development of the Fuel and Energy Sector. Gaz-
prom and Rosneft have a tremendous impact on the 
energy sector (beyond their traditional business in 
natural gas and oil) as well as other industrial and 
manufacturing sectors. They rank in the top 100 of 
global companies with market values of US$62.5 bil-
lion and US$51.1 billion,26 respectively. The big energy 
companies provide improved living standards in re-
mote regions and have a multiplicative effect for pro-
ducing regions.27 Last but not least, the companies 
(first and foremost Gazprom) served as a “treasury” for 
the Russian state to finance projects of “state interest”, 
for example the 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi.28 
A mapping of the Russian gas industry has to in-
clude Novatek, a smaller gas producer. Novatek’s 
Leonid Mikhelson teamed up with Gennadiy Timchen-
ko, an acquaintance of President Putin, in 2011/2012.29 
Since then, Novatek has become active in the German 
and European markets.30 Timchenko also founded 
Gunvor, one of the world’s largest commodity trading 
companies. In the oil sector, Lukoil is Russia’s second-
largest oil company and the largest private player. It is 
said that its top managers, Vagit Alekperov and Leonid 
Fedun, have more than 30 per cent control of the com-
pany.31 The third-largest Russian oil company is Sur-
gutneftegaz, followed by Gazprom Neft, the oil unit 
of Gazprom. The former has a very opaque ownership 
structure, raising suspicion that there exist close ties 
to President Putin himself. The Russian oil transport 
 
25  “Igor Sechin”, Rosneft website, http://www.rosneft.com/ 
about/management/igor-sechin/ (accessed 20 July 2015). 
26  “The World’s Biggest Public Companies”, Forbes, 2015, http:// 
www.forbes.com/global2000/list/#tab:overall (accessed 20 July 
2015). 
27  Mitrova, “The Political and Economic Importance of Gas” 
(see note 15), 20/21. 
28  Ibid., 21. 
29  Jonas Grätz, What Kind of Competition?, unpublished paper 
(March 2014). 
30  Details of the deals were not published but most likely took 
place on the basis of natural gas swap arrangements with E.ON 
and/or Gazprom. 
31  “Lukoil, Good Promise, Tangible Progress”, Gazprombank, 
14 February 2013, 1, http://www.gazprombank.ru/upload/iblock/ 
b3d/gpb_lukoil_feb13.pdf (accessed 21 July 2015). 
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company Transneft transports about 90 per cent of the 
oil extracted in Russia and also handles the majority 
of Russian oil exports; 100 per cent of the voting shares 
are state-owned.32 Inter RAO UES is the major elec-
tricity producer in Russia, in which the state-owned 
Rosneftegaz Group holds 27.6 per cent of the shares. 
Sechin is head of the board of directors. 
In general, foreign access to the Russian hydrocar-
bon sector has been strictly limited by law. Western 
partners of Rosneft are ExxonMobil (United States), 
ENI (Italy), Statoil (Norway), INPEX (Japan), China 
National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and Sinopec 
(China), and also ONGC (India). BP holds a 19.75 per 
cent share in Rosneft. Gazprom’s partners are BASF 
Wintershall, E.ON, Shell and ENI. Novatek’s partners 
encompass Total and China National Petroleum Cor-
poration.33 Three production-sharing agreements 
exist: Sakhalin-1 (Exxon, ONGC) and -2 (Shell) and 
Kharyaga (Total and Statoil). 
As a consequence of this strong interwoven web 
of energy companies and the political elite, Russian 
energy politics are opaque and driven by particular 
interests. Without doubt, the Kremlin has the final say 
in the strategic sector. The Presidential Commission, 
headed by Sechin, is viewed as an influential body. The 
government of Dmitry Medvedev and the Minister of 
Energy, Alexander Novak, seemed to have lost ground. 
The recently merged Antimonopoly Service and the 
Federal Service on Tariffs are involved, too. That said, 
the reforms of natural monopolies remains a highly 
contested issue. 
Western Sanctions and the 
Russian Energy Sector 
This topography of Russian energy elites and their 
ties to the Kremlin are reflected by Western sanctions, 
which have been tailored to companies and key mem-
bers of the elite. The EU imposed sanctions in Septem-
ber 2014 that are targeted at Russian shale oil and 
 
32  Transneft, http://www.en.transneft.ru/about/ (accessed 22 July 
2015). 
33  Galina Starinskaya, “Inostranczy’ ostanutsya. Inostranny’e 
neftegazovy’e kompanii poka ne sobirayutsya otkazy’vat’sya ot 
raboty’ v Rossii nesmotrya na risk vvedeniya protivstrany’ mezh-
dunarodny’x sankczij” [“Foreigners Will Stay. Foreign Oil and 
Gas Companies Are Not Yet Going to Stop Working in Russia De-
spite the Risk of International Sanctions”], Vedomosti.ru, 6 March 
2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/23661921/ 
inostrancy-ostanutsya (accessed 15 December 2014). 
deep-water Arctic offshore oil development.34 Specific 
equipment may no longer be exported. Sanctions on 
the financial sector target Rosneft, Transneft and Gaz-
prom Neft, which are prevented from raising long-
term funds from European capital markets. As major 
Russian banks are also on the list, refinancing is get-
ting more complicated for the whole energy sector. 
The EU sanctions were extended in June 2015 till 
January 31, 2016. The United States is listing Rosneft, 
Lukoil, Gazprom and Surgutneftegaz. Timchenko, 
co-owner of Novatek, and Igor Sechin, head of Rosneft, 
are on the US list.35 
Russia reacted to Western sanctions with counter-
sanctions, which reinforced the isolationist economic 
and autocratic political course by cutting imports. 
Moreover, the rouble’s devaluation made Russian goods 
more competitive.36 Russia still has a relatively low 
state debt of 12 per cent of GDP, a fiscal buffer of 
US$150 billion and large foreign exchange reserves of 
US$350 billion to cushion the effects from the sanc-
tions and low oil prices, but these reserves as well as 
the reserve fund will dwindle.37 There are good reasons 
to believe that the financial sanctions have strength-
ened the political leverage of the Kremlin vis-à-vis 
the companies, because the Russian government an-
nounced that sovereign wealth funds will be used 
to bail out (energy) companies hard-hit by sanctions. 
Refinancing and debt payments are becoming critical 
for many companies – first and foremost for Rosneft. 
Russia has two funds to cushion itself from sanc-
tions and low oil prices – the Reserve Fund and the 
National Wealth Fund – but these reserves are shrink-
ing very quickly. After being subjected to Western 
sanctions, Rosneft, GazpromNeft and Novatek asked 
for financial support from the National Wealth Fund. 
Yet, a fourth of this fund is held in illiquid assets, and 
another part is allocated for infrastructure. Most im-
portantly, though, it is technically part of the pension 
system. Rosneft originally requested US$50 billion 
from the National Wealth Fund, then scaled it back to 
 
34  See in more detail: Peter Rutland, “The Impact of Sanctions on 
Russia”, Russian Analytical Digest, no. 175 (17 December 2014), 2–7. 
35  “Ukraine Crisis: Russia and Sanctions”, BBC, 19 December 
2014, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26672800 (accessed 
11 August 2015). 
36  Rutland, “The Impact of Sanctions” (see note 34), 5. 
37  Daria Orlova, “Russland: Inlandsnachfrage in Krisenstim-
mung”, in DekaBank, Makro Research, Emerging Market Trends (10 
April 2015): 4; and Daria Orlova, “Russland: Zentralbank in der 
Zwickmühle”, in DekaBank, Makro Research, Emerging Market 
Trends (15 September 2015): 4. 
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US$21.3 billion. In August 2015 President Putin 
decided not to give any money to Rosneft unless a 
feasible payoff plan in light of oil prices of US$40–$45 
per barrel could be presented.38 The rouble’s devalua-
tion has led to a revaluation of Rosneft’s debt and 
resulted in financial losses: Net profits decreased by 
35 per cent and debts increased by 35 per cent in 
2014 compared to 2013.39 Gazprom, the leading gas 
company, has applied for US$3.2 billion for its oil 
subsidiary, Gazprom Neft.40 Novatek got an approval 
for US$3 billion from the National Wealth Fund.41
Last but not least, the situation of sanctions and 
counter-sanctions increases insecurity for joint ven-
tures by Russian and foreign companies – in Russia, 
but also in the West. Two laws are currently in the 
Russian Duma: The “Rotenberg law”, which promises 
compensation to Russian citizens whose assets are 
frozen by foreign governments, eventually through 
seizing foreign assets;42 and the law abolishing the 
jurisdictional immunity of foreign governments.43 
Against this background, Russian natural gas, oil 
and electricity policies are analysed in the following 
chapters in order to identify the political and eco-
nomic motivations, interests and dynamics behind 
them and whether and how they respond to global 
market changes, demand uncertainty and/or geo-
politics. 
 
38  “Vladimir Putin ne dast deneg “Rosnefti” [“Vladimir Putin 
Will Not Give Money to Rosneft”], Vedomosti.ru, 5 August 2015, 
http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/08/06/603694-
rosnefti (accessed 20 August 2015). 
39  “Konsolidirovannaya finansovaya otchetnost’ OAO ‘NK Ros-
neft’ 31 dekabrya 2014 [“Consolidated Financial Statement 
of ‘Rosneft’ for 2014”], http://www.rosneft.ru/attach/0/12/99/ 
Rosneft_FS_2014_RUS.pdf (accessed 20 August 2015). 
40  Andrew E. Kramer, “Russia’s Well for Corporate Bailouts Ap-
pears to Be Running Dry”, New York Times, 10 March 2015, http:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/03/10/business/dealbook/in-russia-the-
well-for-corporate-bailouts-might-run-dry.html (accessed 22 Oc-
tober 2015). 
41  “ME’R odobrilo vy’dachu 150 mlrd rublej NOVATE’Ku iz 
FNB” [“Ministry for Economic Development Approved 150 Billion 
Roubles from the National Wealth Fund for Novatek”], Kommer-
sant.ru, 10 December 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/ 
2630006 (accessed 21 August 2015). 
42  “V Gosdumevnov’ otlozhili vtoroe chtenie ‘zakona Roten-
berga’” [“Duma Has Again Postponed the Second Reading of the 
‘Rotenberg’ Law”], forbes.ru, 11 February 2015, http://www.forbes. 
ru/news/280067-v-gosdume-vnov-otlozhili-vtoroe-chtenie-zakona-
rotenberga (accessed 30 September 2015). 
43  “Gosduma obsudit yurisdikczionnij immunitet Rossii” [“Du-
ma Will Discuss Jurisdictional Immunity in Russia”], Regnum, 
24 September 2015, http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1977735. 
html (accessed 30 September 2015). 
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At the Core: Natural Gas 
 
German/EU-Russian Gas Relations – 
Figures and Facts 
Germany and the EU face a persisting oligopoly of 
pipeline-based natural gas suppliers. Russia is the 
major supplier to the EU. The absolute import vol-
umes have levelled-off during the past decade (see 
Figure 1). The share of imports from Russia has been 
fluctuating also due to alternative LNG supplies, 
though (see Figure 2). The three major suppliers – Nor-
way, Russia and Algeria – are increasingly facing (po-
tential) competition due to liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
volumes. This has already helped EU customers nego-
tiate better conditions in their contracts, even though 
diversification is taking place at the margins. This is 
particularly true for Germany. 
The implementation of the internal market has 
increased competition, for example inside Germany, 
but the oligopoly of suppliers basically has persisted 
due to the German pipeline-based import structure: 
Germany’s top supplier remains Russia (Gazprom) (see 
Figures 3 and 4), followed by Norway (mostly Statoil), 
the Netherlands (mostly Gasterra), domestic producers 
and other countries. The EU’s supplies are also 86 per 
cent pipeline-bound and 14 per cent in LNG (figures 
for 2013).44 
Beyond the quantity of trade flows, the quality of 
the close commercial ties between Russian and (West-
ern) European companies has been remarkable. The 
German-Russian relationship certainly has been the 
most far-reaching one for Western Europe: In the 1990s 
and 2000s, bilateral German-Russian institutions were 
dominated by the paradigm of “interdependence”, 
which translated into a business model of ever-closer 
cooperation along the entire transnational natural gas 
value-chain through asset swaps and quid-pro-quo 
deals. The most prominent package deal included the 
building of the Nord Stream pipeline through the 
Baltic Sea. In parallel, Germany’s BASF Wintershall 
and E.ON Ruhrgas became involved in gas and gas-
condensate production in western Siberia, whereas 
 
44  Eurogas, Statistical Report 2014 (Brussels: 2014), 7, http://www. 
eurogas.org/uploads/media/Eurogas_Statistical_Report_2014.pdf 
(accessed 22 October 2015). 
Gazprom expanded its transport, trading and distri-
bution activities in Germany. For a while, Ruhrgas 
was Gazprom’s largest foreign shareholder, with 6.5 
per cent. However, Ruhrgas – and later E.ON Ruhrgas – 
refused to sell strategic parts of the business to Russia, 
despite several attempts by Russia. BASF Wintershall 
entered into a close alliance with Gazprom. For German 
as well as other Western companies, this strategy cre-
ated an inroad into the Russian upstream sector. 
EU-Russian Gas Relations in Transition 
Bilateral gas relations have seen the most dramatic 
change, even before the crisis in Ukraine broke out. 
Prior to the Internal Market Packages in the EU, the 
institutional setting “bridged” and connected two 
markets with a differing internal market structure. 
It was designed for the long-term and based on a 
bilateral political and commercial consensus. The 
cooperation between the Soviet Union/Russia and 
Western Europe built on: 1) complementary economic 
structures, as well as interests; 2) matching market 
structures and 3) corresponding business models.45 
Complementarity was created through the fact that 
the Soviet Union aimed to further develop its hydro-
carbon sector and energy infrastructure. Western 
European energy consumers such as Germany aimed 
for diversification against the backdrop of the oil crisis 
in the 1970s. The market structures matched perfectly: 
an importing company received gas at the border from 
a producing company. Subsequently, the business 
model was based on long-term, oil-indexed delivery 
contracts, with terms of 20, 25 or 30 years, including 
a minimum take-or-pay obligation to purchase at least 
75 to 85 per cent of the named quantity. These obliga-
tions represented a counterweight to the supplier’s 
duty to maintain the necessary level of production. In 
that sense, the business model allowed the two parties 
to balance the price and quantity risks: The producer 
bore the price risk, whereas the importer bore the 
risk of failing to sell the full quantity. The contracts 
 
45  See in more detail: Westphal, “Institutional Change in Euro-
pean Natural Gas Markets” (see note 3). 
EU-Russian Gas Relations in Transition 
SWP Berlin 
Russian Energy Policies Revisited 
December 2015 
 
 
 
15 
Figure 1 
EU-28: Natural gas imports from Russia (in bcm) 
Source: Eurostat.  
*  European Commission, Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets. 
Market Observatory for Energy, DG Energy, vol. 8 (issue 1, first 
quarter of 2015), Brussels 2015, S. 9, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/ 
sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_european_gas_ 
markets_q1_2015.pdf. 
Figure 2 
EU-28: Share of total natural gas imports from Russia 
(in % of extra EU-28 imports) 
Source: Eurostat.  
*  European Commission, Quarterly Report on European Gas Markets. 
Market Observatory for Energy, DG Energy, vol. 8 (issue 1, first 
quarter of 2015), Brussels 2015, S. 9, https://ec.europa.eu/energy/ 
sites/ener/files/documents/quarterly_report_on_european_gas_ 
markets_q1_2015.pdf. 
Figure 3 
Germany: Natural gas imports from Russia (in bcm) 
Source: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle. 
Figure 4 
Germany: Share of total natural gas imports from 
Russia (in %) 
Source: Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle. 
 
 
included provisions for adapting prices to changing 
market conditions at regular intervals. “Demarca-
tion” at the border was clear; gas was delivered to the 
“flange”46 at the border. The market and contract 
structures, as well as the business model, were designed 
to serve both ends of the pipeline and provided the 
basis for long-term, stable relations. 
In the 1990s bilateral German-Russian institutions 
were dominated by the paradigm of “interdependence”, 
which translated into a business model of ever-closer 
alliances along the entire transnational natural gas 
value-chain. Demarcation at the border was blurred as 
a result of asset swaps and quid-pro-quo deals. These 
 
46  The flange is a technical installation connecting two pipes; 
it implies the delivery point right at the border. 
deals contradicted the EU’s objective of liberalised 
and competitive gas markets. 
Since 1998, the EU has been going through a sen-
sitive transition that has affected policies, market 
structures, companies and commercial transactions 
as part of the Internal Market Packages. When the 
EU Commission started to revise long-term delivery 
contracts and to bring an end to “bundled” business 
models with the Internal Market Packages of 2003 
and 2009, the market structures and business models 
changed fundamentally. In particular the Third Ener-
gy Package to implement a really competitive, func-
tioning and integrated EU market for electricity and 
natural gas has changed consecutive bilateral energy 
relations on many levels. 
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Russia has always been very clear about its histori-
cal preference for the traditional organisation of the 
gas market, fitting with its market order. Moreover, 
the business cases and economics, for example for 
Gazprom’s infrastructure projects Nord Stream and 
South Stream, changed under the Third Energy Pack-
age. Russia raised concerns that with the full opera-
tion of network codes (2015–2016) under the third 
package, a contractual mismatch of transmission and 
long-term contracts, a potential loss of capacity, and 
the problem of booking additional capacity may ham-
per its gas trade.47 Gazprom has also profited from the 
changes, though. Gazprom still supplies European 
companies under (revised) long-term contracts, which 
lock-in 110–160 billion cubic metres per year (bcm/y) 
of EU demand,48 but it has also started to trade on a 
spot-market basis, in particular through its subsidiary 
in London, Gazprom Marketing and Trading. Moreo-
ver, it has expanded downstream in the former inter-
mediary segment, in storage, and downstream market-
ing and trading in EU markets. Gazprom’s cumulative 
investment till 2014 was US$6.51 billion, 39 per cent 
of which was invested in Germany (US$2.53 billion).49 
Contentious Issues in the 
Bilateral Relationship 
The EU-Russian gas relationship is beset by conten-
tious issues that had accrued by 2013/2014, which 
began even before the crisis in and around Ukraine. 
These issues centre on pipelines and the future of 
Ukrainian gas transit; EU regulation under the Third 
Energy Package; as well as Gazprom’s dominance in 
Eastern European markets, culminating in the Anti-
trust Case of the EU Commission against Gazprom. 
 
47  Katja Yafimava, The EU Third Package for Gas and the Gas Target 
Model: Major Contentious Issues Inside and Outside the EU, OIES Paper: 
NG 75 (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies [OIES], April 
2013), and Jonathan Stern, The Role of Russia in European Gas Supply, 
Presentation at E-World Conference (Essen, 12 February 2014). 
48  “Gazovyj ry’nok Evropy’: utrachenny’e illyuzii i robkie nadezh-
dy’” [“European Gas Market: Lost Illusions and Diffident Hopes”], 
ed. V. A. Kulagin and T. A. Mitrova, NRU HSE and ERI RAS (Moscow: 
National Research University, Higher School of Economics and En-
ergy Research Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, 2015), 71. 
49  Eurasian Development Bank (Evrazijskij Bank Razvitija), 
“Monitoring pryamy’kh investitsij Rossii, Belarusi, Kazakhstana i 
Ukrainy’ v stranax Evrazii” [“Monitoring of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Coun-
tries of Eurasia”] Doklad 28 (St. Petersburg: 2014), 28, http:// 
bit.ly/1HCg4B7. 
Table 1 
Export pipelines from Russia to Germany and the 
North-West European gas market 
Transmission system Output capacity to 
European countries 
Actual imports 
of EU and Turkey 
(2014) 
Ukrainian gas Trans-
mission system 
approx. 120 57.2 
Yamal-Europe 34 36.6 
Nord Stream 55 33.9 
Source: Miguel Martinez, Martin Paletar, and Harald Hecking, 
The 2014 Ukrainian Crisis: Europe’s Increased Security Position. Natural 
Gas Network Assessment and Scenario Simulations (Cologne: Institute 
of Energy Economics at the University of Cologne, 2015), 20, and 
Andreas Heinrich, “Introduction: Export Pipelines in Eurasia”, 
in Export Pipelines from the CIS Region: Geopolitics, Securitization and 
Political Decision-Making, ed. Andreas Heinrich and Heiko Pleines 
(Stuttgart: ibidem-Verlag, 2014): 1–73, and Russland-Analysen 
no. 303 (23 October 2015): 9. 
As Table 1 shows, Russia exports natural gas to 
Europe via four existing pipelines: 1) the Ukrainian 
Gas Transmission System; 2) the Yamal Pipeline 
through Belarus and Poland; 3) the Nord Stream pipe-
line through the Baltic Sea directly into Germany; and 
4) the Blue Stream pipeline via Turkey with a capacity 
of 16 bcm/y. Pipeline connections can supply Finland 
and the Baltics with 5 bcm/y. 
A major contentious political issue centres on the 
future of Ukrainian gas transit. The Kremlin and Gaz-
prom have had a clear preference for reducing the tran-
sit volume levels through Ukraine and building direct 
links into the EU market. This objective has become 
more pronounced following the Russian-Ukrainian 
gas disputes in 2006 and 2009. In 2014 Russia vowed 
to end transit of Russian gas in 2019. The EU member 
states’ positions were split over the transit issue, but 
supplies to Ukraine became a solidarity issue after the 
crisis with Russia unfolded. The EU Commission wants 
to maintain transit through the country. Through that 
lens, proposed pipeline projects are being judged by 
the EU Commission. Moreover, EU regulation has im-
pacts on pipelines in the EU market, in the coastal and 
exclusive economic zones of EU waters, and in the Ener-
gy Community of western Balkan States, Ukraine, 
Moldova and Georgia. 
Nord Stream’s full capacity is unused because of the 
restriction on the OPAL pipeline, the pipeline link joint-
ly owned by Gazprom and Wintershall that connects 
Greifswald (where Nord Stream lands onshore) to the 
Czech border. The pipeline has a capacity of 36 bcm/y, 
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but only half of the capacity can be used solely by Gaz-
prom for 22 years, based on a partial exemption of 
2009. The Commission’s decision of 200950 stipulated 
that the pipeline improves the security of supply but 
not competition, so if Gazprom wanted to use more 
than half the Czech border capacity, it would have to 
carry out a gas-release programme of 3 bcm/y. Gaz-
prom did not implement this. In October 2013 the 
German regulatory authority, the Bundesnetzagentur, 
OPAL Gastransport and Gazprom achieved a compro-
mise in which Gazprom would offer the other 50 per 
cent of capacity on the gas-capacity auction platform 
PRISMA. Gazprom would also have the right to bid.51 
Other supplies imported via Nord Stream are trans-
ported further by the Norddeutsche Erdgasleitung with 
a capacity of 20 bcm/y. This pipeline is fully regulated. 
The other contentious issue was the building of a 
new pipeline from the Russian port Anapa through 
the Black Sea to Austria/Italy. With the experience of 
OPAL in mind, Gazprom did not apply for an exemp-
tion but instead concluded a series of Intergovern-
mental Agreements with EU member states. This was 
perceived by the Commission as breaking EU law, and 
it exerted pressure on the respective member states. 
In summer 2014 Bulgaria stopped construction. More-
over, on April 30, 2014, Russia requested consultations 
with the European Union and its member states regard-
ing measures relating to the energy sector through 
the “Third Energy Package” Directives, Regulations, 
implementing legislation and decisions at the World 
Trade Organization.52 The process is underway with 
the establishment of a panel. The application of the 
existing regulation to South Stream is somewhat in-
consistent, as the Third Energy Package does not con-
tain any provisions for new infrastructure. The Com-
mission argued only in the spirit of the law.53 
 
50  Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Betreff: Aus-
nahmegenehmigung der Bundesnetzagentur für die OPAL-Gasleitung 
gemäß Art. 22 der Richtlinie 2003/55, K(2009) 4694, 12 June 2009, 
9 and 22. 
51  “German OPAL Gas Capacity to Be Sold on PRISMA if EC 
Agrees: BNetzA”, Platts, 4 February 2014, http://www.platts.com/ 
latest-news/natural-gas/brussels/german-opal-gas-capacity-to-be-
sold-onprisma-26680357 (accessed 23 July 2015). 
52  World Trade Organization (WTO), Dispute Settlement: Dispute 
DS476. European Union and Its Member States – Certain Measures Relat-
ing to the Energy Sector, 30 April 2014, http://www.wto.org/english/ 
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds476_e.htm (accessed 18 December 2014). 
53  Jonathan Stern, Simon Pirani and Katja Yafimava, Does the 
Cancellation of South Stream Signal a Fundamental Reorientation of Rus-
sian Gas Export Policy?, Oxford Energy Comment (Oxford: Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies, January 2015), 3/4, http://www. 
The Antitrust Case of Directorate General Competi-
tion, launched on September 4, 2012, has three major 
allegations: 1) destination clauses, 2) denial or limits 
on Third Party Access and 3) allegation of unfair pric-
ing.54 The probe was launched a year after a number 
of offices of Gazprom and other energy companies had 
been searched. 
What adds to the complicated picture is that future 
EU gas demand is highly uncertain and has recently 
levelled-off in the EU-28. A rebound is very uncertain, 
as it depends on the overall energy mix, the share of 
renewable energy and even more importantly, coal 
and the price difference between coal and gas. More-
over, the image of natural gas is being affected nega-
tively by the crisis in and around Ukraine. Neverthe-
less, natural gas trade-relations remain at the core 
of bilateral energy relations. From a German and EU 
perspective, the following issues and questions are 
of particular interest: 
1) How is Russian gas production developing – on the 
federal and the regional scale? How is Gazprom’s 
role and position in the Russian gas market devel-
oping vis-à-vis “independent” gas producers? How is 
Gazprom’s room for manoeuvre transforming vis-à-
vis the Kremlin? 
2) For a long time, the transport and export monopoly 
of Gazprom has been (perceived as) a major obstacle 
to market convergence with the EU. Even if harmo-
nisation seems a far cry from realisation in 2015, 
liberalisation of the Russian gas market could dis-
burden future gas relations. Will we see further 
structural reforms on the domestic gas market? 
Will there be liberalisation of and competition for 
non-Gazprom companies, which could be perceived 
as a major step forward to theoretically facilitate 
EU-Russian gas trade, transport and investment? 
3) Given the fact that Russia is the largest gas supplier 
to the EU, any change in Russian export strategies 
will greatly affect secure, stable and affordable gas 
supply to Europe. How are foreign energy policies 
developing? How does this affect future export pipe-
line projects as well as existing transit corridors 
from Russia? 
 
oxfordenergy.org/2015/01/cancellation-south-stream-signal-
fundamental-reorientation-russian-gas-export-policy/ (accessed 
22 October 2015). 
54  Alan Riley, Commission v. Gazprom: The Antitrust Clash of the 
Decade?, CEPS Policy Brief, no. 285 (Brussels: Centre for European 
Policy Studies, 31 October 2012), 8–10. http://www.ceps.eu/ 
publications/commission-v-gazprom-antitrust-clash-decade 
(accessed 22 October 2015). 
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Table 2 
Gas production in Russia by company (bcm/y)(selected) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gazprom 461.5 508.6 513.2 487.0 487.4 443.9
Novatek  32.8  37.3  52.9  56.5  61.2  62.1
Rosneft  12.6  12.3  12.8  16.4  38.2  56.7
Lukoil  14.8  18.5  18.6  19.9  20.4  20.0
Source: Annual reports of Novatek, Rosneft, Gazprom. 
 
These issues have to be considered against the 
crisis in Ukraine. The question is whether the current 
deterioration will have a short-term effect or whether 
this determines long-term developments in trade, 
transport and investment relations. 
Natural Gas Production in Russia 
Three trends can be identified that impact on the 
Russian gas matrix in the short- to midterm. First, 
Gazprom is still the major gas-producing company in 
Russia, but other non-Gazprom producers are catching 
up. While the Russian gas behemoth experiences a de-
cline in production, the so-called independents (read: 
non-Gazprom producers) are increasing their output 
(see Table 2). Second, production is also expanding in 
eastern Siberia and the Far East. In parallel to Gaz-
prom’s gasification programme of Russia’s east, LNG 
and pipeline export projects reinforce this shift to the 
east. Third, Gazprom has surplus production capacity 
of about 100 bcm/y (more than e.g. annual demand in 
Germany) in western Siberia and the Yamal Peninsula, 
which is connected to the pipelines to Europe. 
Presently, the bulk of production still stems from 
the western Siberian gas fields owned by Gazprom. 
These supergiant gas fields display depletion rates of 
76–79 per cent in the case of Medvejye and Yamburg-
skoye, and 54 per cent in the case of Urengoy field.55 
Thus, the Russian gas sector is entering a new stage. 
Yet, Russia has plenty of reserves, and a new phase of 
exploration and exploitation has already started. With 
regard to the future, production costs are rising as the 
maturing supergiant gas fields have to be replaced grad-
ually by new fields under more difficult geographic, 
 
55  “Prognoz razvitiya e’nergetiki mira i Rossii do 2040 goda” 
[“Projections of International and Russian Energy Development 
up to 2040”], ed. Institut Energeticheskikh Isledovanij Rossiskoj 
Akademii Nauk (ERIRAS) (Moscow, 2014), 135, http://www.eriras. 
ru/files/forecast_2040.pdf (accessed 15 December 2014). 
climatic or geological conditions. Smaller newer fields 
have to be put on-stream, and infrastructure has to be 
built. There are geological, geographical and technical 
choices ahead for Russia: Which kinds of fields? And 
where to tap into? The decisions will be influenced by 
domestic developments, the tax regime, the low-cost 
development of brown and green fields, and export 
strategies. Many of the new fields are in the hands of 
non-Gazprom oil and gas producers that have received 
tax breaks, though they do not have automatic access 
to the UGSS, operated by Gazprom. 
The Kremlin has increasingly pushed for competi-
tion to increase production but also to put pressure on 
Gazprom to increase effectiveness and flexibility. This 
also helps to reduce informational asymmetry, as Gaz-
prom has long been seen as a state within a state. The 
mineral extraction tax for independent gas producers 
is lower than for Gazprom: US$8 against US$10.9 for 
1,000 cubic metres in 2015.56 As a result, it has proved 
difficult for Gazprom to compete for example with 
Novatek, which can offer significantly lower prices 
and additional incentives in terms of payments and 
supplies. 
Table 2 illustrates that Gazprom’s production has 
decreased, whereas non-Gazprom producers have in-
creased their volumes. Thus, due to the rising number 
of independent gas producers, Gazprom’s relative 
share of the domestic market has continues to decline 
and is now below 70 per cent, with overall Russian gas 
production measuring 639.2 bcm in 2014. Gazprom’s 
investments peaked in 2011–2012. It is evident, that 
its actual production corresponds to demand, and de-
mand has been decreasing in all of Gazprom’s major 
markets: the domestic market, the EU and Ukraine. 
 
 
56  “Nalog na doby’chu polezny’kh iskopaemy’kh (NDPI)” [“Min-
eral Extraction Tax”] (Federal Tax Service of Russia, 2015), http:// 
www.nalog.ru/rn77/taxation/taxes/ndpi/ (accessed 7 September 
2015). 
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Table 3 
Natural gas sales on the domestic market by company (bcm/y) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Gazprom 262.6 262.1 265.3 249.7 228.1 217.2
Novatek  32.9  37.1  53.7  58.9  64.2  67.2
Rosneft  n/a  9.8  9.7  11.1  39.1  56.5
Source: Annual reports of Novatek, Rosneft, Gazprom. 
 
Growth in demand is only happening in Turkey. Gaz-
prom is still less profitable on the domestic market, 
and it is depending on export sales to boost its rev-
enues and cash flows. 
For Gazprom, the development of the new gas 
reserve base on the Yamal peninsula has led to a sur-
plus capacity of 100 bcm/y, which adds to the com-
plicated business environment of the Russian natural 
gas behemoth. As stated above, Gazprom has the 
capacities to increase production because it has put 
the Bovanenkovskoye gas field (Yamal) into operation: 
In 2013, it produced 46.3 bcm, but total annual capac-
ity is projected at 115 bcm. Gazprom is long in west-
ern Siberian gas due to declining domestic demand, 
rising supply levels by non-Gazprom producers and its 
capacity to increase gas production. Gazprom’s entire 
Russian production could be increased up to 550–600 
bcm due to putting the Bovanenkovskoye and Kirin-
skoye gas fields into operation. The latter gas field is 
part of the Far Eastern Sakhalin III project and has a 
planned annual capacity of 5.5 bcm. This project also 
includes the Yuzhno-Kirinskoye and Mynginskoye 
fields. The former was subjected to US sanctions in 
August 2015 because this offshore field contains oil, 
too.57 Due to overcapacity, Gazprom decreased invest-
ment levels in exploration and exploitation by 41 per 
cent in the first quarter of 2015 and increased invest-
ments in infrastructure. 
Domestic change: Increasing competition 
and declining demand 
The domestic market is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult for Gazprom because of rising competition with 
other producers and declining demand. The share 
 
57  Federal Register 80, no. 152 (Friday, 7 August 2015), Rules and 
Regulations, pp. 47402–47405; from the Federal Register Online 
via the Government Publishing Office, http://www.gpo.gov, FR 
doc no. 2015–19274, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2015-08-
07/pdf/2015-19274.pdf (accessed 24 September 2015). 
of independents supplying the Russian market has 
increased from 6 per cent in 1996 to 32.4 per cent 
in 2014 (see Table 3). Thus, in 2014 Gazprom’s gas 
supplies to the internal market decreased consider-
ably (see Table 3). At the same time, the current situa-
tion on the Russian domestic gas market is character-
ised by falling gas consumption: In 2014 it accounted 
for 441.6 bcm, which is 3.3 per cent less than in 2013.58 
The decline in domestic gas consumption is ex-
plained by the drop in production in the industrial 
sector (e.g. the steel industry) and reduced power gen-
eration by thermal power plants. A significant portion 
of natural gas is consumed in the residential and mu-
nicipal sector (50–60 bcm/y) compared to 65–70 bcm/y 
in the industrial sector and 260 bcm/y in the power 
and district heating sector.59 
The domestic gas market in Russia is a dual market: 
In general, all prices for private households are regu-
lated. All industrial consumers – and most of all elec-
tricity producers – have access to the wholesale mar-
ket. As the quasi monopolist, Gazprom has to sell gas 
at regulated prices to these customers, while all other 
producers can offer price discounts. This is the reason 
why the so-called independent gas producers have suc-
cessfully increased their market shares. 
Since the 1990s, it has been a frequent plea by the 
West (voiced by the World Bank, the IMF and the EU 
among others) to raise Russian domestic gas prices to 
a net-back level.60 And indeed, prices rose 15–25 per cent 
per annum until 2012.61 When the Russian economy 
 
58  “Neftegazovaya i neftepererabaty’vayushhaya promy’shlen-
nost: tendentsi i prognozy’” [“Oil and Gas Recovery and Refinery: 
Trends and Prospects”], ed. RIA (Moscow, 2015), 41. 
59  Simon Pirani, Consumers As Players in the Russian Gas Sector, OIES 
Working Papers (Oxford: OIES, January 2013), 13. 
60  Net-back level means export revenues generated at a market-
place minus all costs to get the gas to the (export) market. 
61  “Russian Gas: Domestic Market Blues”, Natural Gas Europe, 14 
July 2014, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/russian-gas-market-
tatiana-mitrova (accessed 23 July 2015). See also: Catherine 
Locatelli, The Russian Gas Industry: Challenges to the “Gazprom Model”, 
Shifting Export Strategies and LNG Export Liberalisation in 2013 
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formally stagnated – and in the face of social protests 
in 2011 and 2012 after the (re)elections of the Duma 
and President Putin – the initial goal to achieve parity 
with the European net-back price was abandoned. The 
range for domestic gas prices in 201462 was approxi-
mately US$2.77 per million British thermal units 
(mbtu) for companies and US$2.22 for individuals.63 
Novatek and Rosneft managed to sell more gas 
to large industrial customers because 40 per cent of 
Gazprom’s contracts expired in 2012–2013 and the 
two stepped in as alternate suppliers. If the sales trend 
continues,64 then Novatek’s and Rosneft’s plans to in-
crease their own annual gas production to 112 bcm 
and to 100 bcm by 2020 will have been achieved. 
Thus, Rosneft and Novatek – both of which have 
strong ties to the Kremlin – are putting Gazprom under 
increasing levels of pressure. At the heart of the fierce 
competition are access to the UGSS65 and the right to 
export natural gas. Gazprom (still) holds the monopo-
ly on gas transport, underground storage and pipeline 
exports. The analysis shows that Gazprom is under 
pressure on both the internal and external markets. 
 
Cahier de recherché EDDEN no. 7/2013 (Grenoble: Economie du 
développement durable et de l’énergie, June 2013), 8. 
62  Average gas price for companies and individuals in roubles 
increased in 2014 compared to 2013, but decreased in US$ due 
to rouble devaluation. 
63  In 2014, gas prices for companies in Russia accounted for 
US$98 for a thousand cubic metres and US$78.4 for individuals. 
In the United States for the same period, gas prices accounted 
for US$194 and US$466.6, respectively. “Sila v razvitii: Gazprom 
v tsy’frakh 2010–2014 [“Power in Development: Gazprom in 
numbers 2010–2014”], Gazprom, 84, http://www.gazprom.ru/f/ 
posts/00/302817/gazprom-in-figures-2010-2014-ru.pdf (accessed 
27 November 2015). 
64  Thus, for example, E.ON Russia and Fortum concluded a 15-
year contract with NOVATEK, which will supply companies with 
180 bcm. Novatek also became an exclusive gas supplier for Ural-
kaliy, a producer of fertilisers, and signed a contract with Mos-
energo to supply 27 bcm of gas in 2013–2015. “NOVATE’K posta-
vit ‘E.ON Rossiya’ gazna 702 mlrd rub. do 2027 g.” [“Novatek Will 
Supply E.ON Russia with Gas on 702 Billion Rouble up to 2027”], 
Oilcapital.ru, 28 February 2012, http://www.oilcapital.ru/company/ 
173858.html (accessed 15 December 2014). 
65  Gazprom has the exclusive right to manage the UGSS, but 
third-party access has been established since 1997. Yet, Gazprom 
instrumentalised all the information about congestion and capac-
ity rates to largely refuse it. The UGSS served as the major tool 
for Gazprom to concentrate strategic resources (information 
about the sector and finances) in the headquarters of Gazprom. 
In 2009, then-Prime Minister Putin gave better “third-party ac-
cess”: Gazprom has to provide other gas producers with gas trans-
mission services if there is spare capacity on a non-discrimina-
tory basis. Third parties can appeal to the Federal Antimonopoly 
Service or court. 
The fact that the domestic Russian gas market is 
undergoing structural changes has significant impacts 
on Gazprom’s entire sales strategy. Gazprom is now 
under pressure because of higher taxes, stagnant do-
mestic prices as well as decreasing export revenues 
and long-term oil-indexed contracts being scrutinized. 
A breakdown of Gazprom revenues in 2013 shows that 
power generation accounted for 7 per cent, domestic 
gas sales for 15 per cent, the sale of liquids for 30 per 
cent, European gas sales for 32 per cent and gas sales 
to the former Soviet Union for 10 per cent of total 
company revenues (plus 6 per cent miscellaneous).66 
This affects Gazprom’s strategy to balance and trade-
off between the domestic and European markets as 
well as the market for the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States. 
One strategy is to increase its activities in the elec-
tricity sector; another is a fuel switch from gasoline to 
natural gas in (public) transport. Gazprom is the main 
lobby for that change, and the decision on promoting 
the use of natural gas in vehicles throughout the coun-
try was made for (the sake of) Gazprom.67 A number of 
political steps have been taken to support natural gas 
as a fuel in transport.68 
Shifting Export Strategies and LNG Export 
Liberalisation in 2013 
It should come as no surprise that the Russian govern-
ment has given priority to LNG exports and liberalised 
them at the end of 2013. This move was a logical re-
 
66  Ralf Dickel et al., Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas, 
OIES Paper 92 (Oxford: OIES, October 2014), 57, http://www. 
oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NG-92.pdf 
(accessed 15 December 2014). 
67  For Gazprom this is an opportunity to increase the number 
of domestic gas consumers and increase its revenues. If estab-
lished goals to shift 50 per cent of public transport to gas are 
achieved, the share of gas-engine business will account for 5.3 
per cent of Gazprom gas sales by 2020 and 18 per cent by 2030. 
“Inert Gas”, Exploration and Production Journal (ed.) 5, no. 44 (2014), 
43–48. 
68  In May 2013, Prime Minister Medvedev signed a decree 
recommending regions to decrease transport tax for vehicles 
using gas. In June 2015 the State Duma approved new legislation 
incentivising construction and use of compressed natural gas 
stations. A month before, the government approved additional 
subsidies for regions using gas as fuel in public transport. The 
share of gas transport by 2020 should account for 50 per cent in 
cities with more than one million inhabitants, 30 per cent with 
300,000 inhabitants and 10 per cent in towns with 100,000 in-
habitants. 
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action to: the stagnation of gas demand in Europe and 
future uncertainties; subsequent changes in the gas-
pricing regime; rapid scaling-up of LNG markets and 
growth in demand in the Asia-Pacific region; and last 
but not least the “shale revolution” and increasing 
self-sufficiency in North America. In this environment 
of rapid change, high-risk conditions and increasing 
competition, Russia was looking for diversification in 
its exports – and in particular export opportunities – 
that are not tied to a particular market. Russia has 
also been following the dynamics in the Pacific and 
Asian markets.69 The most important motive has been 
to secure Russia’s global market share and to poten-
tially even increase the absolute volumes of exports. 
Russia responded to these fundamental market 
shifts. LNG exports became a priority for the Russian 
government in the 2013–2014 period. The law on LNG 
liberalisation came into legal force on December 1, 
2013. It liberalised LNG exports to the Pacific, thereby 
breaking up Gazprom’s long export monopoly, but 
only in a small market segment. This strategic move 
was decisive, but in fact long overdue. Russia missed 
out on the rise of LNG in the past decade, concentrat-
ing instead on the pipeline-based European markets.70 
LNG has a number of advantages: there is no depend-
ency on transit countries, it opens new markets and 
it provides far more flexibility. Furthermore, it is a 
means towards developing related technologies and 
industries. Last but not least, this economic shift has 
foreign policy and geopolitical implications because it 
enhances the strategic importance of the northern sea 
route and strengthens Russia’s geo-economic presence 
in the Asia-Pacific region. This was the Russian ration-
ale in 2013. 
Yet, the liberalisation was done in a very selective 
manner: It favoured the state-owned oil champion Ros-
neft and the private company Novatek, co-owned by 
Mikhelson and Timchenko, with close ties to the Krem-
lin. Novatek primarily initiated the liberalisation of 
LNG exports. Its “Yamal LNG” project has been at an 
advanced stage of implementation because it received 
all environmental and state approvals for project docu-
mentation necessary for: the construction of infra-
structure, production and liquefaction of gas at the 
South-Tambeyskoye field, and finally LNG shipping 
from the port of Sabetta in October 2013. This selec-
 
69  Tatiana Mitrova, Russian LNG: The Long Road to Export, IFRI 
Russia.Nei. Reports no. 16 (Paris: Institut français des relations 
internationales, December 2013), 3 and 19. 
70  Ibid. 
tive liberalisation was not the only limitation. Most 
importantly, a special mechanism of LNG export co-
ordination was envisaged. Gas exporters are obliged 
to provide the Ministry for Energy with information 
about prices.71 The clear goal is to keep export prices 
stable and to avoid dumping among Russian exporters. 
LNG exports have not really taken off in Russia: 
Sakhalin-2 is the only working LNG terminal in Russia, 
with exports of almost 11 million tons annually.72 It 
is presently being operated by Gazprom, Royal Dutch 
Shell, and the Japanese companies Mitsui and Mitsu-
bishi. The project came on-stream in 2009, and the 
majority of the gas is designated for Japan and South 
Korea. However, it is not really being viewed as “authen-
tically Russian”, as it evolved from a Production Shar-
ing Agreement and was originally pushed by Shell. 
In addition, a number of Russian LNG projects have 
been envisaged to be put into operation between 2016 
and 2020: Yamal LNG (by Novatek), Sakhalin-1 (by Ros-
neft), Vladivostok LNG and Baltic LNG (both Gazprom). 
In particular, Gazprom has been pressured to enhance 
its own liquefied gas exports: the expansion of the 
Sakhalin-2 project, the Vladivostok project and the new 
Baltic LNG project. 
The Yamal LNG plant of Novatek – originally sched-
uled for the end of 2016 with an initial annual capac-
ity of 5.5 million tons – looked to be the most promis-
ing one. In fact, the entire project is designed to be 
comprised of three trains, each with a capacity of 5 to 
5.5 million tons per year (translating into 10 million 
tons/y by 2018 and a total capacity of 15–16.5 million 
tons/y).73 In July 2013, Daewoo Shipbuilding & Marine 
Engineering won the tender for the construction of 
16 LNG tankers (ice-class ARC7).74 The first tanker was 
scheduled to leave the port in December 2016. Ninety 
per cent of Novatek’s LNG from Yamal has already 
been contracted. However, because of economic sanc-
tions, Yamal LNG has faced technological and finan-
cial problems and therefore might be delayed for two 
to three years.75 
 
71  Ibid., 3. 
72  Ibid., 11. 
73  “Yuzhno-tambejskoe mestorozhdenie (Projekt ‘Yamal SPG’)” 
[“Yuzhno-tambejskoe Field (‘Yamal LNG’ Project)”], Novatek, http:// 
www.novatek.ru/ru/business/yamal/southtambey/ (accessed 
11 December 2014). 
74  “Tankery’ dlya ‘Yamala SPG’ postroit yuzhnokorejskaya DSME” 
[“South-Korean DSME Will Build Tankers for ‘Yamal LNG’”], 
Oilcapital.ru, 4 July 2013, http://www.oilcapital.ru/transport/ 
213196.html (accessed 11 December 2014). 
75  Mikhail Serov and Elena Hodyakova, “Yamalskij gaz mozhet 
zaderzhatsya” [“‘Yamal-LNG’ Might Be Delayed”], Vedomosti.ru, 
Shifting Export Strategies and LNG Export Liberalisation in 2013 
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Gazprom’s Vladivostok LNG (10 million tons) and 
the Sakhalin-1 (5 million tons) – a joint project by Ros-
neft, ExxonMobil, Sodeco and ONGC – were both 
scheduled to start in 2018.76 
Gazprom’s Baltic LNG project is planned for 2020, 
and the investment decision was taken in April 2015.77 
The port will be Ust’Luga. It is foreseen to export 10 
million tons of LNG, plus 5 million tons of compressed 
natural gas yearly. However, recent economic sanc-
tions against Gazprom complicate the feasibility, as 
Gazprom depends entirely on liquefaction equipment 
from American Air Products & Chemicals and the 
German Linde Group.78 
There is one more private (potentially Floating) LNG 
project – Pechora LNG by the Alltech Group of Dmitry 
Bosov, with a capacity of 2.6 million tons per year in 
the Nenets Autonomous District. In May 2014, Rosneft 
and the Alltech Group signed a cooperation agree-
ment that was updated in June 2015. 
Russia has had the strategic objective of gaining a 
20 per cent share in global LNG markets by 2030. In 
the new draft strategy for 2035, this goal has not yet 
been quantified. Given the long lead-times for LNG 
projects, it is very unlikely that Russia will boost its 
LNG export capacity rapidly. Russian projects have 
been delayed, first by the sanctions, which complicate 
technology exports from the West, and second by dif-
ficulties in financing the projects. Low oil and gas spot 
market prices in Asia and Europe have significantly 
diminished the appetite to invest in expensive LNG 
infrastructure. Yet, the window for good opportunities 
to gain larger LNG market shares in the Pacific closes 
around 2018, as a number of globally planned LNG 
 
19 May 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article/680951/ 
yamalskij-gaz-mozhet-zaderzhatsya (accessed 11 December 2014). 
76  Grigory Vygon and Maria Belova, “Razvitie mirovogo ry’nka 
SPG: vy’zovy’ i vozhmozhnosti dlya Rossii” [“The Development of 
a Global LNG Market: Challenges and Opportunities for Russia”], 
Moscow: Moscow School of Management, Skolkovo Energy Cen-
ter, June 2013, 6. http://www.pro-gas.ru/images/data/gallery/0_ 
206_SEneC_Global_LNG.pdf (accessed 23 October 2015). 
77  Mikhail Serov, “Gazprom prinyal investiczionnoye resheniye 
po proektu ‘Baltijskij SPG’” [“Gazprom Has Taken an Investment 
Decision on the Baltic LNG”], Vedomosti.ru, 17 April 2015, http:// 
www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/04/17/gazprom-prinyal-
investitsionnoe-reshenie-po-proektu-baltiiskii-spg (accessed 24 
August 2015). 
78  Mikhail Serov, “‘Gazprom” ishhet zamenu importu” [“Gaz-
prom Seeks Import Substitution”], Vedomosti.ru, 17 February 
2015, http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/articles/2015/02/17/ 
gazprom-protiv-importa (accessed 24 August 2015). 
projects will be realised by then.79 Competition will 
increase because projects in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Papua New Guinea 
are coming on-stream. Therefore, most likely, some of 
the projects will be postponed or cancelled. 
Last but not least, Rosneft and Gazprom are stuck 
in fierce competition over LNG exports from Sakhalin. 
A major issue again for Rosneft was third-party access 
to Sakhalin-2’s pipeline to reduce costs for Sakhalin-1. 
However, Gazprom claimed that it plans to expand its 
own LNG plant within the Sakhalin-2 project.80 There 
were several appeals in courts. The final decision, taken 
in September 2015, granted Rosneft with access to 
Sakhalin-2 pipeline and export capacity of 8 billion 
cubic metres per year.81 Moreover, Gazprom’s Yuzhno-
Kirinskoye gas field was put on the US sanctions list. 
Because of that, Gazprom will have either to postpone 
or cancel the extension of Sakhalin-2, look for Chinese 
equipment or cooperate with Rosneft. The major issue 
with Rosneft then is the selling price for gas.82 
Moreover, in addition to gas competition on the 
domestic market, Rosneft and Gazprom will start to 
compete on export market as LNG traders at the end 
of 2015. Both have signed contracts with the Egyptian 
Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS).83 For Rosneft, 
it will be their first experience in LNG trade; Gazprom 
already has a trading portfolio of more than 3 bcm/y. 
Both will source LNG from other producers. 
From an EU perspective, Russia’s LNG expansion 
will have an (in)direct, positive impact because it con-
 
79  Natural Gas Facts and Figures: LNG, ed. International Gas Union, 
September 2014, http://www.igu.org/sites/default/files/node-page-
field_file/FactsFiguresSept2014_LNG.pdf (accessed 11 December 
2014). 
80  “Russian Court Rejects Rosneft Access to Sakhalin II Gas Pipe-
line”, Enerdata, 20 February 2015, http://www.enerdata.net/ 
enerdatauk/press-and-publication/energy-news-001/russian-court-
rejects-rosneft-access-sakhalin-ii-gas-pipeline_31682.html 
(accessed 20 February 2015). 
81  Galina Starinskaya, “‘Rosneft’ dobilas’ dostupa k gazovoj 
trube” [“‘Rosneft’ Gained Access to Gas Pipeline”], Vedomosti.ru, 
10 September 2015, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/ 
2015/09/10/608221-rosneft-dobilas-dostupa-k-gazovoi-trube 
(accessed 11 September 2015). 
82  Mikhail Serov and Margarita Papchenkova, “Sankczii SSHA 
mogut pojti na pol’zu ‘Rosnefti’ i Exxon” [“US Sanctions Might 
Be Beneficial for ‘Rosneft’ and Exxon”], Vedomosti.ru, 20 August 
2015, http://www.vedomosti.ru/business/articles/2015/08/20/ 
605528-sanktsii-ssha-polzu-rosnefti-exxon (accessed 24 August 
2015). 
83  “Rosneft and EGAS Agreed on the Term Sheet of LNG Sup-
plies”, Rosneft.com, 7 July 2015, http://www.rosneft.com/news/ 
pressrelease/07072015.html (accessed 24 August 2015). 
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tributes to an increase in flexible LNG supply world-
wide – a development that benefits the EU’s import 
strategies. Moreover, Novatek’s Yamal LNG could bring 
“alternative Russian gas” to EU markets. Ninety per 
cent of Novatek’s LNG from Yamal has already been 
contracted.84 LNG volumes could find their way into 
the EU, in particular in winter. 
The Geopolitical Shifts of 2014: From LNG 
Back to Pipelines? From West to East? 
It seemed like 2014 was a watershed year for Russian 
natural gas export policies. The deterioration of the 
relationship with the West after the crisis in Ukraine 
resulted in a pronounced “povorot na vostok” (pivot 
to the East). This pivot comprises three dimensions: 
enhancing export options, replacing Western tech-
nical equipment and generating financial resources. 
With regard to technical equipment, Novatek’s Yamal 
LNG project can serve as an illustrating case again: 
Initially the plan was to buy LNG technology from 
American Air Products & Chemicals. During the 
course of 2014, Novatek signed two contracts with the 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC)85 
and with the Philippine company AG&P.86 Asian com-
panies are newcomers on the market of LNG technol-
ogies. Yamal LNG is situated in the Arctic with tough 
climatic conditions, and any technological accidents 
will lead to huge financial losses and severe ecological 
consequences. In terms of financing, US$3.6 billion 
 
84  Spanish Gas Natural Fenosa (2.5 m tons or 7 bcm), Total (4 m 
tons or 11.3 bcm), Novatek Gas & Power (2.86 m tons or 8 bcm), 
China National Petroleum Corporation (3 m tons or 8.5 bcm) and 
Gazprom Marketing&Trading (3 m tons or 8.5 bcm). Interestingly, 
the contract between Novatek and Gazprom is based on oil-in-
dexation with free on-board conditions in Zeebrugge (see: Yuriy 
Barsukov, “NOVATE’K otdal SPG ‘Gazpromu’” [“Novatek Gave 
LNG to Gazprom”], Kommersant.ru, 26 May 2014, http://www. 
kommersant.ru/doc/2479486 (accessed 15 December 2014). In 
addition, Novatek has reserved 5 per cent of its volumes (820,000 
tons or 2.3 bcm) for sale on the spot market to avoid possible fines 
on long-term contracts in case the project is delayed because of 
sanctions (Yuriy Barsukov, “U NOVATE’KA zakonchilsya SPG”, 
[“Novatek Ran Out of LNG”], Kommersant.ru, 30 September 2014, 
http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2578496 (accessed 15 December 
2014). 
85  “CNOOC Gets USD 1.6 Bln Yamal LNG Deal”, Lngworldnews.com, 
10 July 2014, http://www.lngworldnews.com/cnooc-nets-usd-1-6-
bln-yamal-lng-deal/ (accessed 11 December 2014). 
86  “Yamgaz Awards Yamal LNG Contract to AG&P”, Lngworld-
news.com, 8 October 2014, http://www.lngworldnews.com/yamgaz- 
awards-yamal-lng-contract-to-agp/ (accessed 11 December 2014). 
in support was approved from the Russian National 
Wealth Fund for the project,87 but a large portion of 
the money is expected to come from the Chinese In-
vestment Fund, which intends to buy 9.9 per cent of 
Yamal LNG.88 
The most visible moves have been the (announced) 
Sino-Russian pipeline projects, though. Due to the im-
pact of the Ukraine crisis and growing tensions with 
the West, it was no surprise that decade-long negotia-
tions came to a successful end when Russia and China 
concluded the deal on the “Power of Siberia”. Export 
projects to the east are an additional component to 
Gazprom’s gasification of the East, as these supplies 
will not only be used for domestic consumption but 
also for exports. Whether this becomes a burden or a 
benefit depends on the respective price (or whether 
the gas is at least sold as cost plus) levels achieved. 
In any case, Russia’s economically sound strategy to 
diversify and send its (liquefied) natural gas exports 
to Asia led to the establishment of a Russian-Chinese 
energy relationship in 2014. The LNG strategy was very 
much driven by economic considerations and a “shale 
reaction”. In light of the deteriorating relationship 
with the West, geopolitical considerations have re-
inforced geo-economic rationales in Russian energy 
policies with a stronger orientation towards Asian 
markets. Western sanctions and the impacts of the 
slump in oil prices made long-distance pipelines a first 
choice. The construction of the pipeline(s) to China 
might seriously undermine the financial stability of 
Gazprom and will increase Russia’s dependence on 
China. It will significantly affect Russian energy prior-
ities in terms of investment flows into production 
sites and infrastructure, too. 
In May 2014, Russia and China concluded the 
“Power of Siberia” deal. The details of the deal are 
obscure, but it is foreseen that, under the framework 
of the US$400 billion deal, Russia will export 38 bcm/y 
to its large neighbour over 30 years.89 Estimated prices 
 
87  “‘Yamal SPG’ proinvestiroval pervy’j transh iz FNB I gotovit-
sya k polucheniyu vtorogo” [“Yamal LNG Has Invested the First 
Tranche from the National Wealth Fund and Prepares to Receive 
the Second One”], Kommersant.ru, 10 July 2015, http://www. 
kommersant.ru/doc/2766510 (accessed 24 August 2015). 
88  “Novatek Sells Yamal LNG Stake to China’s Silk Road Fund”, 
LNG World News, 3 September 2015, https://www.lngworldnews. 
com/novatek-sells-yamal-lng-stake-to-chinas-silk-road-fund/ 
(accessed 4 September 2015). 
89  Sara Lain, “The Significance of the China-Russia Gas Deal. 
Russia’s Efforts to Get the Deal Signed Suggest That Events in 
Ukraine Have Had an Impact”, The Diplomat, 24 May 2014, http:// 
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are calculated to be somewhere around US$350 per 
thousand cubic metres, compared to the average Euro-
pean price for Russian natural gas of US$380.50 per 
thousand cubic metres (in 2013 prices).90 In other 
words, both sides seem to have agreed on a price of 
US$10 per mbtu.91 China has long insisted that it will 
not pay more than the US$9 per mbtu it pays for Turk-
men gas, but it seems that the price has been deducted 
from the benchmark price for LNG in Asia – then at 
16–17 mbtu, excluding liquefaction, transport and re-
gasification. Yet, there are major questions involving 
the whole package of building the pipeline and the 
distribution of costs. If this is taken into considera-
tion, the deal will cost more than US$100 billion and 
might be less favourable for Gazprom, as amortisation 
of Russian investments will not be granted over the 
next decades.92 The final investment decision has been 
taken and the pipeline is under construction. 
The second project still in the phase of fast-track ne-
gotiations is the “Altai pipeline” or “Power of Siberia-2 
Pipeline”. Gazprom and China signed the framework 
agreement in November 2014. This “Western route” is 
projected to have an initial capacity of 30 bcm/y, with 
a potential increase of up to 100 bcm/y. There is no 
agreement about the gas price so far, and in the cur-
rent environment it will be difficult to achieve a con-
sensus. 
From Gazprom’s point of view, the project makes a 
lot of sense. On the one hand, the Altai pipeline would 
mean really diversifying the energy portfolio and in-
cluding both western and eastern markets. It offers 
the possibility of arbitrage between one market and 
 
thediplomat.com/2014/05/the-significance-of-the-china-russia-gas-
deal/ (accessed 15 December 2014). 
90  Alec Luhn and Terry Macallister, “Russia Signs 30-Year Deal 
Worth $400bn to Deliver Gas to China”, theguardian.com, 21 May 
2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/21/russia-30-
year-400bn-gas-deal-china (accessed 15 December 2014). 
91  James Paton and Rebecca Penty, “Russia-China Gas Accord to 
Pressure LNG in Canada, Australia”, Bloomberg.com, 11 November 
2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-11-11/russia-china-
natural-gas-ties-seen-leading-to-lng-project-delays.html (accessed 
15 December 2014). 
92  Mikhail Krutikhin, “Kak Kitai pereigry’vaet ‘Rosneft’ i ‘Gaz-
prom’” [“How China Plays Rosneft and Gazprom”], Vedomosti.ru, 
18 September 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/news/ 
33554431/poddavki-skitaem (accessed 15 December 2014). For 
a detailed analysis, see: Morena Skalamera, The Sino-Russian Gas 
Partnership: Explaining the 2014 Breakthrough, Paper, Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University, November 2014). 
another, depending on prices.93 Partial infrastructure 
is already in place, and gas could be delivered from 
western Siberian gas fields,94 where Gazprom has 
spare production capacity. Thus, this project is of 
much greater strategic importance for Europe than 
the Power of Siberia deal because this pipeline would 
link the western Siberian gas fields – which are also 
supplying the EU – to China [see Map 1, p. 19]. On 
the other hand, the economic viability of the project 
remains very questionable. Total investments for 
the Power of Siberia are estimated at US$70 billion; 
the Altai pipeline would cost much less (an estimated 
US$20 billion). From a Chinese perspective, the pipe-
line would increase security of supply and create more 
competition with central Asian gas.95 But, at the same 
time, the pipeline enters the Chinese market in a 
region far from the consumption centres. Yet, the 
“known unknown” for the Altai pipeline is China and 
the attractiveness it attaches to the project, which de-
termines the concessions and support offered to Russia. 
The deals with China shed light on changing pro-
duction and export equations. Gazprom has called for 
annual increases in domestic gas prices that are above 
the inflation rate because it needs money to finance 
the construction of the Power of Siberia gas pipeline.96 
Yet, the Russian government will certainly be cautious 
about presenting its citizens with rising prices. 
To summarise, the signing of the gas agreement 
with China will have an ambiguous effect on the global 
gas market: Gas prices in the Asia-Pacific region have 
demonstrated a downward trend since the beginning 
of this year, and the gap between gas prices in Europe 
and Asia has also narrowed. The Russian-Chinese gas 
contract is an additional factor providing downward 
pressure on prices in Asia. On the one hand, Russian 
 
93  Dickel and others, Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas 
(see note 66), 58. 
94  Mikhail Serov, “Gazprom mozhet sdelat’ stavku na trubo-
provod ‘Altaj’” [“Gazprom Might Stake on the ‘Altai’ Pipeline”], 
Vedomosti.ru, 19 November 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
companies/news/36170951/altaj-bystree-sily-sibiri (accessed 19 
December 2014). 
95  James Henderson, The Commercial and Political Logic for the Altai 
Pipeline (Oxford: OIES, December 2014), http://www. oxfordenergy. 
org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/The-Commercial-and-
Political-Logic-for-the-Altai-Pipeline-GPC-4.pdf (accessed 19 
December 2014). 
96  Such a step could result in an annual increase in domestic 
gas prices of 8–10 per cent. “Gazprom prosit razmorozit’ czeni 
na gaz na vnutrennem ry’nke iz-za ‘Sily’ Sibiri’” [“Gazprom Asks 
to Unfreeze Gas Prices on the Internal Market because of the 
‘Power of Siberia’”], rbc.ru, 26 June 2014, http://quote.rbc.ru/ 
person/2014/06/26/34175928.html (accessed 15 December 2014). 
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pipeline gas might force out certain LNG volumes that 
were initially destined for the Chinese market. These 
additional LNG volumes on the global market might 
then find their way into Europe. On the other hand, 
decreasing gas prices in Asia bring into question the 
profitability of many LNG projects, especially Cana-
dian and Australian but also US LNG projects. 
Gazprom seems to be taking an opportunistic and 
tactical position to keep as many options on the table 
as possible. Therefore, numerous smaller and bigger 
export projects have been presented in the past 
months.97 
More Rationality in 2015? 
Developments in the Russian domestic gas market 
have a great impact on Gazprom’s export strategies 
as well as the Kremlin’s foreign gas policy. The two 
no longer work in conjunction with one another. The 
moves made concerning exports have to be seen in 
light of Gazprom’s difficult situation on the domestic 
markets and its significant loss of political leverage. 
In any case, the Power of Siberia gas deal puts 
additional pressure on Gazprom. Most likely, Gazprom 
will not be able to put its own fields of Kovykta (lo-
cated in the Irkutsk Oblast) and Chayanda (located 
in Sakha Yakutia) into operation in due time. Both 
deposits contain liquids and oil. Gas processing equip-
ment has to be installed in order to export dry natural 
gas. Thus, Gazprom might need gas from gas fields 
owned by Rosneft (Sredneboutobinskoye) and Surgut-
neftegaz (Talakanskoye). Rosneft has plans to produce 
40 bcm/y in east Siberia, but the actual volumes are 
still very limited.98 The Power of Siberia gas pipeline 
could be scaled-up to deliver up to 61 bcm/y. 
Thus, Rosneft is fiercely lobbying to break Gaz-
prom’s export monopoly. Four options have been 
under discussion since 2014: 1) to maintain the 
 
97  Total costs of the big pipeline projects announced over the 
course of 2014/2015 amount to US$150 to US$200 billion. If Gaz-
prom prioritises these pipelines, especially under the circum-
stance of sanctions and decreasing oil prices, it will have to post-
pone its “export dreams”, such as particular LNG plants and 
pipeline projects in the east to Japan or to the Korean Peninsula. 
See: Edward C. Chow and Zacharias D. Cuyler, New Russian Gas 
Export Projects: From Pipe Dreams to Pipelines, CSIS Commentary 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
22 July 2015), http://csis.org/publication/new-russian-gas-export-
projects-pipe-dreams-pipelines. 
98  “Russian Court Rejects Rosneft Access to Sakhalin II Gas Pipe-
line” (see note 80). 
regulatory status quo; 2) to have Gazprom buy gas 
from independent producers based on export net-
back99 conditions; 3) to establish a consortium or 
special-purpose-vehicle company100 that will finance 
pipeline construction; and 4) to have Gazprom build 
the pipeline itself, but to open access to independent 
gas producers on the basis of an investment tariff.101 
At the end of July 2015, Rosneft put forward an en-
compassing proposal to reform the natural gas market 
in Russia. The plan foresees several phases.102 The first 
phase in 2016 should open the possibility for independ-
ent producers to export gas and LNG by quota (also 
from deposits on shore, e.g. Pechora LNG); by 2019 the 
independents should receive a share of export rev-
enues (by establishing an independent gas-export opera-
tor); and by 2025 exports should be fully liberalised. 
By then Gazprom should have been split and an inde-
pendent transmission operator created. Given the cir-
cumstances, it is very likely that the two initial phases 
will be implemented one way or another. At the meet-
ing of the Presidential Commission on October 27, 
surprisingly, the issue was not even discussed. A liber-
alisation of pipeline exports to the East seems to be 
postponed at least till the Power of Siberia starts its 
deliveries; for the West it is unlikely to happen prior 
to that. 
Moreover, in October 2014 the gas-trading exchange 
in St. Petersburg resumed its work after a six-year break. 
It was expected that the pricing on the exchange would 
become an important market indicator, and that about 
35 bcm/y would be traded there (around 8 per cent of 
domestic gas consumption). However, the price at the 
exchange is very close to that of domestic long-term 
contracts. Only 6.8 bcm have been sold (as of October 
23, 2015).103 Such scanty volumes can be explained by 
Gazprom’s unwillingness to take part, and by a lack of 
delivery guarantees because Gazprom has a monopoly 
 
99  Export price minus export duty and transport costs. 
100  A special purpose vehicle is a company created to fulfil 
specific objectives. 
101  Mikhail Serov, Margarita Papchenkova and Olga Churakova, 
“Mine’nergo ne nashlo dostupa v ‘Silu Sibiri’” [“Ministry for Energy 
Didn’t Find Access to the ‘Power of Siberia’”], Vedomosti.ru, 11 
September 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/ 
33280291/minenergo-ne-nashlo-dostupa-v-silu-sibiri (accessed 
6 January 2015). 
102  Yuriy Barsukov, “‘Rosneft’ atakuet po vsem frontam” [“Ros-
neft Attacks on All Fronts”], Kommersant, 23 July 2015, http:// 
www.kommersant.ru/doc/2773785 (15 September 2015). 
103  See http://spimex.com/markets/gas/results/ (accessed 18 No-
vember 2015). 
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Table 4 
Russian Federation, NG/LNG Exports (in bcm) 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
EU 28 (Natural Gas) 113.4 111.5 104.7  94.7 126.2 112.0 
China (Liquefied Natural Gas)  0.3  0.5  0.3  0.5  –  0.2 
World (Natural Gas) 176.5 186.5 207.0 185.9 211.3 187.4 
World (Liquefied Natural Gas)  6.6  13.4  14.4  14.8  14.2  14.5 
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010–2015. 
Figure 5 
Russian Federation, share of EU 28 (NG) and China (LNG) in total NG/LNG Exports (in %) 
Natural Gas (NG); Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). 
Source: BP, Statistical Review of World Energy, 2010–2015. 
 
over the UGSS. The failure of the gas-trading exchange 
could potentially strengthen further de-monopolisa-
tion of the UGSS and/or allow sales of Russian gas to 
European consumers at the exchange. 
Russia’s move to diversify its energy portfolio to 
include Asia is taking place, but at a much slower pace 
than political rhetoric would suggest. Yet, the EU mar-
ket will remain by far the major buyer of Russian gas 
at least for the next decade (see Table 4 and Figure 5). 
Major implications for EU gas markets are foreseea-
ble, but only in the medium- to long term. At present, 
the income from gas sales to Europe (and from domes-
tic sales) are critical to finance Gazprom’s new proj-
ects. In other words, Europe will still remain the major 
gas market for Russia, as the first gas supplies to 
China are planned for 2019–2020, and full export 
capacity will only be achieved five years later – 10 
years from now.104 
 
104  “‘Gazprom’: pervy’e postavki rossijskogo gaza v Kitai nach-
nutsya v 2019 godu” [“Gazprom: First Supplies of Russian Gas 
to China Will Be Carried in 2019”], itar-tass.com, 23 March 2014, 
http://itar-tass.com/ekonomika/1211184 (accessed 15 December 
2014). 
In 2014, the crisis in Ukraine and geopolitical ten-
sions with the West were the drivers to get President 
Putin to act and to push through Gazprom’s deals 
with China.105 In 2015, economic rationality seems to 
have struck back. Gazprom is manoeuvring to identify 
short-term solutions for its current problems and long-
term strategies for its future. At the time of writing, 
there are good reasons to argue that Gazprom is con-
centrating on muddling through in the short term 
and on keeping open multiple options to strengthen 
its bargaining position rather than embarking on a 
coherent long-term strategy.106 
There have been very volatile and contradictory 
corporate policy shifts by Gazprom in 2014 and 2015: 
On October 7, 2014, Miller announced that “Gazprom 
is analysing and examining its own strategies which 
guided the company lately. The company is re-evaluat-
ing whether it is worth being everywhere on the value 
 
105  See also: James Henderson and Tatiana Mitrova, The Politi-
cal and Commercial Dynamics of Russia’s Gas Export Strategy, OIES 
Paper: NG 102 (Oxford: OIES, September 2015), 76, http://www. 
oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/NG-
102.pdf (20 November 2015). 
106  Ibid., 76, 77. 
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chain in Europe e.g. from production to retail. […] Gaz-
prom may be more selective in pursuing projects it 
already planned because reaching end users in Europe 
doesn’t necessarily work.”107 In December 2014, Gaz-
prom withdrew from a compromise108 achieved be-
tween the Bundesnetzagentur and the Gazprom joint 
venture OPAL Gastransport (see the earlier section on 
“Contentious issues in the bilateral relationship”). The 
compromise had not received the necessary approval 
from the EU Commission in 2014 (despite the Com-
mission representatives being present at the negotia-
tions). Then, the 100 per cent takeover of WINGAS109 
by Gazprom – already in process – was cancelled. Last 
but not least, Gazprom’s supplies to EU countries were 
reduced over the winter period of 2014/2015 without 
explanation. Commercial reasons for this move, for 
example to maintain a certain price level, are less 
plausible than strategic considerations related to the 
reverse flows from the EU into Ukraine. As Gazprom 
had complained about these deliveries, this might 
have been an attempt to complicate these deliveries. 
With respect to the Ukraine conflict, Gazprom and the 
Kremlin repeatedly announced they would not extend 
the gas transit contract with Ukraine after 2019.110 
A move on the bigger scene of the pipeline game 
was Gazprom’s announcement to abandon South 
Stream in favour of Turkish Stream at the beginning 
of December 2014.111 The capacity of the offshore gas 
 
107  Aleksey Miller, “Vy’stuplenie Alekseya Millera o prognozax 
I problemax mirovoj gazovoj otrasli na IV Peterburgskom mezh-
dunarodnom gazovom forume” [“Statement of Alexey Miller on 
Perspectives and Problems of the Global Gas Industry at the 4th 
St. Petersburg International Gas Forum”], 7 October 2014, http:// 
www.gazprom.ru/press/miller-journal/706409/ (accessed 10 Feb-
ruary 2015). 
108  “Gazprom verzichtet auf volle OPAL Nutzung”, Energate 
Messenger, 15 December 2014, http://www.energate-messenger.de/ 
news/150258 (accessed 19 December 2014). 
109  In December 2014, BASF and Gazprom decided to scrap an 
asset swap, which would have given Gazprom full control of a 
jointly operated European gas trading and storage business, in-
cluding the biggest underground gas facility in Western Europe. 
Chris Bryant and Jack Farchy, “BASF and Gazprom Scrap Energy 
Asset Swap”, Financial Times, 18 December 2014, http://www.ft. 
com/intl/cms/s/0/6ed4660a-86f3-11e4-982e-00144feabdc0.html 
(accessed 19 December 2014). 
110  “Miller: Rol’ Ukrainy’ v kachestve transitera svedetsya k 
nulyu” [“Miller: Role of Ukraine As a Transit-country Will Be 
Diminished to Zero”], Vzglyad, 6 December 2014, http://vz.ru/ 
news/2014/12/6/719045.html (accessed 19 December 2014). 
111  See in detail: Grigoriy Vygon, Vitalij Ermakov, Maria Belova 
and Ekaterina Kolbikova, “Turetskiy Potok” Stsenarii obkhoda ukrainy 
i bar’erov evropejckoy komissii [“Turkish Stream”: Scenarios to By-
pass Ukraine and Barriers of the European Commission] (Mos-
pipeline initially consisted of four strings altogether 
from Russia to Turkey with a capacity of 63 billion 
cubic metres per year; this has been halved to two 
strings. The volumes of the first string of 15.75 bcm/y 
are exclusively intended for Turkish consumers in the 
area of Istanbul, where gas demand is increasing. The 
tentative date for the completion of this first line 
is December 2016. Gazprom’s move is economically 
driven, as the routing of a large part of Turkish Stream 
will follow the old South Stream route but link into 
the European part of Turkey. From there, it can easily 
connect to the TransBalkan line, supply Turkey and 
via reverse flow south-eastern Europe.112 This would 
theoretically allow for matching the goal to bypass 
Ukraine with ever-larger volumes. Moreover, the mere 
announcement of Turkish Stream heavily complicates 
any solution around Ukraine’s role as a transit coun-
try or gas hub. But, at the beginning of July 2015, Gaz-
prom cancelled the contract with Saipem to lay the 
lines under the Black Sea, so Turkish Stream’s future 
is uncertain.113 As of November 2015, the project is 
beset by an ever-more complicated Russian-Turkish 
relationship and Gazprom is sewed to arbitration. 
Thus, rational moves to “rebalance” back to Europe 
happened between June and September 2015: A share-
holder agreement on Nord Stream Phase 2 (lines 3 and 
4) was signed in September, shortly after the respec-
tive non-binding memorandum in June. This agree-
ment was signed by Gazprom, E.ON, Shell, OMV, Win-
tershall and Engie. The construction of two more pipe-
lines would double Nord Stream’s capacity by another 
55 bcm/y. The project gives Gazprom access to major 
EU markets, and European companies are expanding 
their activities in Russia. Yet, the project has to be ac-
commodated under the Third Energy Package, be it a 
gas-release programme at Greifswald and/or a renego-
tiation of delivery points. 
Last but not least, BASF Wintershall and Gazprom 
declared they would conclude the WINGAS asset swap 
at the beginning of September 2015. This was a move 
back to a downstream re-engagement. 
 
cow, June 2015), http://vygon.consulting/upload/iblock/313/ 
vygon_consulting_turkish_stream.pdf (accessed 20 August 2015). 
112  “Turk Stream: The Realm of if, if, if…”, Natural Gas Europe, 12 
February 2015, http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/european-gas-
conference-2015-turkish-stream-8855 (accessed 24 July 2015). 
113  Elena Mazneva and Marco Bertrachhe, “Saipem Loses $2.2 
Billion Gazprom Deal for Black Sea Link”, Bloomberg Business, 8 
July 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0708/ 
saipem-lost-gazprom-contract-on-black-sea-link-over-disputes 
(accessed 24 July 2015). 
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Conclusions from a German and 
EU Perspective 
From a German and EU perspective, four observations 
on Russian gas-market developments have to be em-
phasised. 
First, Gazprom has a surplus of natural gas in west-
ern Siberia, where it invested heavily, also because 
the then Prodi Commission in 2000 had announced it 
would double gas imports from Russia. The company 
is now being hit hard by flat and uncertain demand 
in the EU, declining demand in Russia and also in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States. Due to over-
capacity, Gazprom has decreased investments in ex-
ploration and exploitation by 41 per cent in the first 
quarter of 2015 and increased investments in infra-
structure. 
Second, Gazprom is under pressure to maintain its 
market share in the EU and to open new markets for 
its natural gas. It has thus turned to LNG projects as 
well. Gazprom is also committed to building Power 
of Siberia-1 and needs income from European markets. 
Third, competition in the Russian domestic gas 
market and over export liberalisation is increasing. 
Rosneft is much more strongly orientated towards 
Asia than Gazprom is. In that sense, Gazprom can be 
perceived as an advocate for strong ties with Europe 
based on commercial rationalities. The competition 
between Gazprom, Rosneft and Novatek will remain 
orchestrated by the Kremlin; possibly to gain even 
more political control. 
Fourth, at the time of writing in November 2015, 
there are clear signs that economic and commercial 
rationales will win out over geopolitics again. Gaz-
prom is seeking common ground with EU companies 
and a balancing of commercial interests. Yet, this is 
still a very fragile rapprochement not backed by a 
political solution. 
What are the consequences for Germany and the 
EU then? With regard to major contentious issues of 
gas pricing, captive market shares, pipelines and regu-
latory issues, the following conclusions can be drawn. 
Yet, they offer just a snapshot and are influenced by 
the development of EU-Russian political relations and 
the crisis in Ukraine. Gazprom is in a market position 
that allows it room for manoeuvre because of existing 
infrastructure ties and low short-run marginal costs, 
which are around US$4 per mbtu.114 Gazprom’s pro-
 
114  Henderson and Mitrova, The Political and Commercial Dynamics 
of Russia’s Gas Export Strategy (see note 105), 77. 
duction costs account for less than US$0.65 cent per 
mbtu per 1,000 cubic metres.115 Gazprom’s competi-
tive edge stems from the fact that it can offer the 
lowest-cost gas and that it can price-out other com-
petitors (e.g. US LNG, based on a Henry Hub price of 
US$3 per mbtu plus liquefaction, shipping and re-
gasification adding roughly US$6 per mbtu116) if it 
wants to do so. The full-cost break-even price for 
expensive Yamal gas and transport to the European 
border can be calculated at US$7–10 per mbtu.117 In 
the past, Gazprom has aimed at maintaining a high 
price-level and stuck to oil-indexed contracts. Since 
2009 it has adjusted its formula to hub developments 
and granted retroactive rebates, which resulted in a 
hybrid pricing mechanism,118 even though it formally 
stuck to oil-indexation. Moreover, Gazprom has large 
long-term contract portfolios with EU companies that 
lock in significant market shares. Given that comfort-
able situation, there are clear signs that Gazprom is 
still seeking to maximise the price it can obtain now 
and in the future. This analysis is backed by the results 
of Gazprom’s first-ever auction for European custom-
ers – 3.24 bcm for delivery in the winter of 2015/2016 
– that took place in the Gazprom Export’s office in 
St. Petersburg. Out of these volumes, Gazprom has only 
sold slightly more than 1 bcm to 15 traders at prices 
that were above its own long-term contracts and OTC 
prices at the virtual trading point Gaspool for delivery 
in wintertime.119 
 
115  “Finansovo-E’konomicheskaya politika OAO ‘Gazprom’: 
Press-Konferencziya” [“Press Conference: Economic-Financial 
Policy of Gazprom”], Gazprom, 25 June 2015, 11, http://www. 
gazprom.ru/f/posts/55/584542/presentation-press-conference-
2015-06-25-ru.pdf (accessed 11 September 2015). Own calcula-
tion: US$22.05 per 1,000 m3, in mbtu divided by 35.3 = 62 cents 
per mbtu. 
116  “US LNG Will Not Cause European Gas Price Drop: IEA 
Economist”, Platts, 10 April 2014, http://www.platts.com/latest-
news/shipping/washington/us-lng-will-not-cause-european-gas-
price-drop-21459435 (20 September 2014). 
117  Ralf Dickel, Elham Hassanzadeh, James Henderson, Anouk 
Honoré, Laura El-Katiri, Simon Pirani, Howard Rogers, Jonathan 
Stern & Katja Yafimava, Reducing European Dependence on Russian 
Gas, OIES Paper 92 (Oxford: Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, 
OIES, October 2014), 33 and in more detail 61–63, http://www. 
oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/NG-92.pdf 
(accessed 15 December 2014). 
118  Timofey Dzyadko, “‘Gazprom’ spisal $5 mlrd dolgov” [“Gaz-
prom Wrote Off $5 Billion Debts”], RBC Daily, 14 August 2014, 
http://rbcdaily.ru/industry/562949992137749 (accessed 6 January 
2015). 
119  Elena Mazneva and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Gazprom Prefers 
Price over Volume in First EU Gas Auctions”, Bloomberg.com, 10 
September 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
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Bilateral gas relations are at a very sensitive stage. 
As conflicting issues loom in gas trade and as the geo-
political situation in Eastern Europe is persistently 
difficult, there is the imminent danger of negative 
spillover effects. From a pure energy standpoint, all 
this – together with the rising uncertainties and com-
plexities in international energy relations – requires 
more (not less) political dialogue and more attention 
towards balancing interests. Gas relations should be 
perceived (again) as important channels for coopera-
tion. This does not mean a back to a business as usual 
scenario but rather a mutual adaptation to a new gas 
world. 
Diversifying EU imports will be easier as long 
as Gazprom aims at maintaining a certain price level. 
Gazprom theoretically has significant room for ma-
noeuvre to defend its market share. However, the ex-
pected increase in Russian gas exports, as fixed in the 
draft energy strategy until 2035, is modest (1 to 10 
per cent, compared to an eight- to ninefold increase 
to Asia).120 Because of these uncertainties, the EU gas 
market might experience more gas-price volatility in 
the future. The EU will have to rely on gas imports 
from Russia, but vulnerabilities due to dependencies 
will decrease considerably, as both are diversifying 
away from each other. Pipeline projects under dis-
cussion will have to be thoroughly revised in terms 
of EU gas-market reforms. 
The European Commission is moving forward in 
the Antitrust Case to force Gazprom to adapt its com-
mercial strategies to the EU’s Third Energy Package 
regulation. Russia seems to be more and more willing 
to play according to EU rules and is adapting its gas 
export strategy. This presents the EU with a new situa-
tion. Large volumes of Russian gas will be delivered 
beyond 2020 under long-term contracts. Yet, Gazprom 
will increasingly start to act on spot markets. This will 
happen at a time when own EU reserves are dwindl-
ing, when Norwegian volumes will decrease (if new 
investments are rapidly undertaken) and LNG markets 
might well again be in a downward cycle of supplies 
and high prices. Thus, the EU will have to pursue a 
dual strategy of managing gas interdependence with 
Russia plus pursuing an active diversification from 
 
09-10/gazprom-prefers-price-over-volume-in-first-eu-gas-auctions 
(accessed 14 September 2015). 
120  “E’nergeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 2035 
goda” [“Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2035”], 
Ministry of Energy of Russia, 13 November 2009, http://www. 
minenergo.gov.ru/aboutminen/energostrategy/ (accessed 29 Sep-
tember 2015). 
today onward. Yet, diversifying its energy portfolio 
with supplies from the Caspian region beyond the 
10 bcm being transported through the Transadriatic 
Pipeline (TAP) will remain a big challenge in times 
of uncertain demand. Furthermore, the relevance of 
Turkey in energy (transit) should be taken into the 
picture. 
Moreover, the EU will have to deal with the security 
of gas supply to its south-eastern member states and 
the Energy Community. In particular, gas transport 
will have to be realised and financed by sources other 
than those that are Russian-based after the cancella-
tion of South Stream. The new situation is a logical 
consequence of the EU’s regulatory approach. Yet, the 
question is: To what extent is the EU ready to deal 
with the consequences? There are few new big infra-
structure projects that have been realised, and Gaz-
prom is among the few companies that have invested 
in new pipelines and storage facilities. The questions 
now coming up are at the heart of the EU’s approach 
and will become a real testing ground of its viability: 
They are about financing infrastructure and intercon-
nectivity, beyond the regulated projects under the 
EU’s Ten-Year Network Development Plan procedure. 
These are long-term infrastructure issues; so far the EU 
has been preoccupied with short-term and quite limited 
projects. Finally, there are fundamental questions 
touching upon the issue of more state activity in the 
sector. Most likely, the sheer magnitude of infrastruc-
ture challenges relating to the creation of an internal 
market will involve public spending, as it will not ex-
clusively be realised by using private money. 
The two most sensitive and trickiest issues are Nord 
Stream 2 and the transit through Ukraine. However, 
more pragmatism and economically sound considera-
tions should facilitate a settlement of the contentious 
issues in the bilateral relationship. As Nord Stream 2 
is on the table and has received significant support 
from the involved companies and the German Minis-
try for Economic Affairs and Energy, political and eco-
nomic costs in case of a failure are high. Nord Stream 
2 does not automatically transport new gas to the EU 
market, nor does it bring a diversification of sources. 
It affects the future of Ukrainian gas transit. The sen-
sibility of the issue and the political sensitivities in 
Brussels and eastern EU member states make it very 
difficult to achieve an internal EU consensus. Arith-
metically, just one additional line of Nord Stream 2 
and one of Turkish Stream might be enough to bypass 
Ukraine. On the one hand, the EU’s efforts of support-
ing Ukraine will be difficult without cooperation from 
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Russia. On the other hand, Russia might have to rely 
longer on Ukrainian transit, as alternative projects 
require time. A (face-saving) solution should be found 
for both sides, also with respect to Ukraine. Nord 
Stream 2 requires political will on both sides to accom-
modate the project with the Commission’s priority of 
an Energy Union in solidarity. 
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Not on the Sidelines: Crude Oil and Refining in Russia 
 
The oil sector is the almost forgotten sector in the bi-
lateral relations between the EU/Germany and Russia. 
Yet, this does not reflect reality: Firstly, Russia is among 
the top three oil producers in the world, greatly in-
fluencing the global supply and demand balance as 
well as price developments. Russia produced 10.84 
million barrels per day (mb/d) in 2014, which repre-
sents 12.7 per cent of global oil production.121 Of that 
total, Russia consumed 3.19 mb/d in 2014.122 Secondly, 
Russian oil and oil product exports through ports and 
pipelines into the Atlantic and Pacific basins have a 
global reach. Shifts in its output, refining capacities 
and exports are thus of importance for the world, and 
in particular for EU oil markets, even during the US 
fracking revolution. Thirdly, oil markets are consid-
ered to be more flexible because of their global struc-
ture and price mechanism. Yet, Russian and European 
oil (products) markets are closely knitted together. 
This is so because the physical trade flows are less 
fungible – pipelines still play a strategic role, and 
refineries need specific grades of oil or else require 
expensive renovations. 
Despite oil consumption levels decreasing in the 
EU, oil is still the primary source of energy, compris-
ing 34 per cent of the energy mix. In Germany, oil 
and oil products account for 33 per cent of the overall 
mix.123 This is the backdrop against which Russian oil 
supplies have to be analysed. Oil trade has been the 
frontrunner of bilateral energy relations. Oil supplies 
to the then Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
(Comecon) countries started in 1945 to Western Europe 
in 1957.124 Today, Russia is the major oil supplier to 
the EU, accounting for around 30 per cent of total 
crude imports and more than 50 per cent of oil prod-
uct imports from outside the EU in 2014 (see Figures 6 
 
121  BP, Statistical Review 2015 (see note 8), 8. 
122  Ibid., 9. 
123  Energieverbrauch in Deutschland im Jahr 2013 (Berlin: AG Ener-
giebilanzen e.V., 2014), http://www.ag-energiebilanzen.de/index. 
php?article_id=20&archiv=13&year=2014 (accessed 13 November 
2014). 
124  Nadya Kampaner, “Evropejskaya E’nergobezopasnost’ i 
uroki istorii” [“European Energy Security and Lessons of His-
tory”], Global Affairs (Russia), 16 December 2007, http://www. 
globalaffairs.ru/number/n_9962 (accessed 6 March 2015). 
and 7). In Germany, Russia accounted for 31 per cent 
of crude imports and 26 per cent of oil product im-
ports in 2014 (see Figures 8 and 9). Trade in oil is more 
important than any other commodity in term of the 
total value of all Russian goods exported to the EU.125 
Europe is still the major export destination for Rus-
sian oil. In 2014 Russia exported 4.4 mb/d of crude oil 
to global markets,126 and 68 per cent of that went to 
EU countries.127 The main destinations for its crude oil 
and oil products are Germany (with 725,000 barrels per 
day [b/d]), the Netherlands (706,000 b/d) and Poland 
(470,000 b/d).128 Europe is also the most important des-
tination for Russia’s product exports, for example 80 
per cent of its diesel production is exported to Europe. 
The 2013 Roadmap for EU-Russia Energy Coopera-
tion until 2050 underlines the key role of oil infra-
structure for a stable and secure supply: The Druzhba 
trunk oil pipeline is the most important “oil artery” 
between east and west and the world’s longest oil 
pipeline.129 Its total capacity is 2 mb/d; actual loadings 
are about 1.2 mb/d. It supplies oil directly into Germa-
ny. Yet, the major portion of about 2 mb/d is shipped 
via tanker from port terminals such as Primorsk (Bal-
tic Pipeline System-1, capacity: 1.5 mb/d) and Ust Luga 
(Baltic Pipeline System-2, capacity: 1 mb/d) as well as 
from Novorossiysk on the Black Sea coast.130 
 
125  EC, Roadmap: EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 (see 
note 5), 17. 
126  Oil and Gas Recovery and Refinery: Trends and Prospects, ed. RIA 
(Moscow, 2014), 17. 
127  “Russia: International Energy Data and Analysis”, EIA, http:// 
www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS (accessed 
24 August 2015). 
128  Oil Information: IEA Statistics, 2015, 236–237, 397–398, 442–
443, http://www.iea.org/bookshop/664-Oil_Information_2015 
(20 November 2015). 
129  See EC, Roadmap: EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 
(see note 5). 
130  Sammy Six, Russia’s Oil Export Strategy: Two Markets, Two Faces, 
CIEP Paper 01/2015 (The Hague: Clingendael International 
Energy Programme, 2015), 25, http://www.clingendaelenergy. 
com/inc/upload/files/CIEP_Paper_2015-01_Russia_web.pdf, and 
Clingendael International Energy Programme, Fact Sheet, Russia-
Europe: The Liquid Relationship Often Overlooked, http://www. 
clingendaelenergy.com/files.cfm?event=files.download&ui= 
9C1E06F0-5254-00CF-FD03A39927F34043 (accessed 3 March 
2015). 
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Figure 6 
Germany: Crude oil and oil product imports from 
Russia (million tons) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 7 
Germany: Share of crude oil and oil product imports 
from Russia (in %) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 8 
EU-28: Crude oil and oil product imports from Russia 
(million tons) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Eurostat. 
Figure 9 
EU-28: Share of Russian crude oil and oil product 
imports (in % of extra EU-28 imports) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Eurostat. 
The southern leg of the Druzhba pipeline traverses 
Ukraine and splits into two routes: one connects via 
Hungary to the Adriatic oil pipeline, the other one 
links to Slovakia and the Czech Republic, with further 
connections to Germany (refineries Ingolstadt and 
Karlsruhe); the northern leg of Druzhba crosses from 
Belarus and Poland into Germany, with connections 
to refineries in Schwedt and Leuna. The refinery in 
Schwedt supplies 11 per cent of distilled products in 
Germany.131 The Russian Urals blend is a major input 
for keeping European refineries and the petrochemi-
cals sector economically viable. 
Moreover, Russian oil companies have been major 
investors in the German refinery sector. Rosneft has 
 
131  Mineralölwirtschaftsverband e.V. (MWV), Jahresbericht 2013 
(Berlin: MWV, July 2014), 28. 
invested US$2.25 billion in the EU, of which 63 per 
cent was directed to Germany, that is, US$1.41 bil-
lion.132 These investments are important because 
European refineries have found themselves under 
pressure from US refineries that have access to cheaper 
(domestic and foreign) crude supply, but also from 
new refinery complexes in Asia. 
Relations concerning Russian oil have been much 
less contentious than relations over gas. Yet, a critical 
process is under way, as the former majority owners of 
Yukos Oil Co. won a US$50 billion ruling at the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. The plaintiffs 
are going after Russian state assets around the world
 
132  Evrazijskij Bank Razvitija, “Monitoring pryaamy’kh investi-
czij Rossii” [“Monitoring of FDI of Russia”] (see note 49). 
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Table 5 
Oil production by selected company, million tons 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Rosneft 108.9 115.8 122.6 125.8 203.0 204.9 
Lukoil  97.6  95.9  96.0  84.2  85.5  86.3 
Surgutneftegaz  59.6  59.5  60.8  61.4  61.5  61.4 
GazpromNeft  29.9  29.8  35.3  31.6  49.3  50.9 
Tatneft  26.1  26.1  26.1  26.3  26.4  26.2 
Slavneft  18.9  18.4  18.1  17.9  16.8  16.2 
Bashneft  12.2  14.1  15.1  15.4  16.1  17.8 
Russneft  12.7  13.0  13.6  13.8  15.5  17.0 
Source: Companies’ annual reports. 
 
to reclaim their compensation.133 So far, the process 
has been low key and a quiet settlement seems prob-
able. 
Over the short- and long terms, these are the major 
issues of German/EU interest: 
1) How will Russian production volumes develop? 
What is the impact of sanctions? How will non-con-
ventional production develop (in the Arctic offshore 
and on-shore; shale and tight oil)? 
2) How does the oil market organisation develop in 
Russia? What is the role for Rosneft and other oil 
companies? 
3) How will the strategies of oil companies develop 
(also under the impact of sanctions) against the 
background of competition over market shares? 
How will the refinery sector develop facing a sur-
plus in refinery capacities in Europe and growing 
capacities in the United States, Asia and the Middle 
East? 
Consolidation and Centralisation in 
Russian Oil Production 
Since the Khodorkovsky affair and Yukos’ asset-stripp-
ing starting in 2003, the Russian oil industry has seen 
a centralisation and consolidation under the roof of 
Rosneft. 
Prior to that, in the beginning of the 2000s, all key 
assets were concentrated in the hands of private com-
panies, and state-owned Rosneft accounted only for 5 
 
133  Irina Reznik and Henry Meyer, “Yukos Owners Win $50 Bil-
lion in 10-Year-Fight with Russia”, Bloomberg Business, 28 July 
2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-28/yukos-
owners-win-50-billion-damage-award-vs-russia-gml-says (accessed 
9 March 2015). 
per cent of total production in the country. However, 
for the last 14 years, the share of state-owned oil out-
put (Rosneft, GazpromNeft and Slavneft) increased up 
to 50 per cent (13 times in absolute volumes).134 As the 
biggest oil producer in Russia, Rosneft provided 40 per 
cent of total oil production output in Russia in 2013 
(see Table 5). 
There is a special licensing regime for the strategic 
gas and oil sectors and for subsoil projects of federal 
importance. In 2013 the subsoil law restricted access 
of private investors to oil and gas resources of the Arc-
tic shelf. The largest share of prospective fields and 
licences have already been divided up between Gaz-
prom and Rosneft without any competition. Thus, as 
of October 2014, Rosneft and Gazprom together own 
116 licences.135 Gazprom put the offshore Prirazlom-
noye oilfield in the Pechora Sea into operation in 
December 2013, where it plans to produce 300 thou-
sand tons annually in the early stage and reach the 
level of 5–6 million tons in four to five years. 
A centralisation of the oil sector through a network 
of “Putin loyalists” is evident. Lukoil remains the 
major independent player. Rosneft crucially strength-
ened its asset base during the Yukos affair when it 
took over Yuganskneftegaz. Moreover, the return of 
Bashneft shares to the state, a criminal case against 
Irkutsk Oil Company136 as well as the common belief 
 
134  Projections of International and Russian Energy Development up to 
2040, ed. ERIRAS (see note 55), 135. 
135  “‘Rosneft’ i ‘Gazprom’ poluchili tri liczenzii na shel’fovy’e 
uchastki” [“Rosneft and Gazprom Obtained Three Licenses 
for Shelf”], Gazeta.ru, 20 October 2014, http://www.gazeta.ru/ 
business/news/2014/10/20/n_6577829.shtml (accessed 16 Decem-
ber 2014). 
136  Timofey Dzyadko, “Irkutskaya neftyanaya kompaniya 
poprosila zashity’ ot kreditorov iz Chechni” [“Irkutsk Oil Com-
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that Surgutneftegaz is closely linked to the Kremlin137 
suggest further control by – and a consolidation of – 
state network capitalism. Whereas in the 1990s and 
the early 2000 the Russian (tax) regime in the oil sec-
tor favoured small companies – which actively partici-
pated in tenders and auctions for licences, and there-
by increased Russian oil production – today small-
scale projects have almost no prospects. Russian tax 
incentives are usually targeted and made in the inter-
est of vertically integrated companies. Thus, small 
independent oil companies may almost completely 
disappear in Russia in the future.138 Accordingly, 
whereas in the early 2000s oil production by inde-
pendent companies accounted for 10 per cent of 
total oil production, now it is about 4 per cent. 
Challenges for the Russian Upstream 
Oil Industry 
Russian oil production from conventional fields is 
stagnating, and it will be difficult for Russia to main-
tain its production level under current circumstances. 
Old giant fields have to be replaced, and “new fron-
tiers” have to be opened. The sanctions as well as the 
oil price slump are an impediment to that. 
In 2014 Russia produced 10.75 mb/d oil and con-
densate.139 2015 has seen new record levels of 10.77 
mb/d.140 The growth in oil production in 2015 was 
stimulated by an increase in exports, which, in turn, 
 
pany Asked for Protection against Creditors from Chechnya”], 
RBC, 6 November 2014, http://top.rbc.ru/business/06/11/2014/ 
545a12b0cbb20fb4868bfad7 (accessed 19 December 2014). 
137  James Henderson, Key Determinants for the Future of Russian 
Oil Production and Exports, OIES WPM 58 (Oxford: OIES, 2015), 5, 
http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2015/ 
04/WPM-58.pdf (accessed 23 October 2015). 
138  Grygoriy Vygon, Anton Rubtsov and Elena Savchik, “Est’ 
li budushhee u sektora rossijskikh nezavisimy’kh neftyany’kh 
kompanij?” [“Do Independent Oil Companies in Russia Have a 
Future?”], Moscow: Moscow School of Management Skolkovo 
Energy Center, February 2014, http://www.assoneft.ru/activities/ 
developments/459/#573271330446 (accessed 23 October 2015). 
139  Dina Khrennikova and Stephen Bierman, “Russia Gas Fields 
Key to crude output after sanctions hit arctic”, 5 May 2015, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-05-04/russia-gas-
fields-key-to-crude-output-after-sanctions-hit-arctic (accessed 27 
November 2015). 
140  Stephen Biermann and Julian Lee, Russia oil production 
poised for record as industry defies slump”, 29 October 2015, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-10-29/russia-oil-
production-poised-for-record-as-industry-defies-slump (accessed 
27 November 2015). 
became more attractive for companies in order to 
increase hard currency earnings. It is also a result 
of the tax manoeuvre to reduce export duties on oil. 
Thus, oil production in Russia in 2015 will most likely 
not fall, and might even increase in the short term 
due to the launch of the pipeline Sapolarye-Purpe as 
well as the development of several major oilfields 
(Suzun, Yurubcheno-Tahomskoye, Kuyumbinskoye). 
The picture gets more vague with respect to the 
medium term because of a number of factors at play 
(the Russian “tax manoeuvre” of January 2015; rouble 
devaluation; investment plans for upstream develop-
ment and/or refinery modernisation; delay of Arctic 
and tight oil developments; and the development of 
enhanced oil recovery in brownfields or new green-
fields).141 The growth potential in the medium term is 
limited due to lack of funding necessary for the devel-
opment of new oilfields. Taking into consideration 
the economic sanctions, oil production is expected to 
decrease: by 3–5 per cent per a year instead of 1.5 per 
cent, according to the Bank of America Merrill Lynch.142 
Future prospects will determine the companies’ 
investment decisions, as the reservoirs in Yamal, the 
Barents Sea, eastern Siberia and the Far East encoun-
ter much higher production costs and require not 
only a certain level of return, but also long-term de-
mand. Russia is facing the same problems as other 
conventional producers because conventional pro-
duction is reaching its plateau. Oil production from 
existing giant fields is stagnating in Russia – 90 per 
cent of oil production in Russia is extracted from old 
oilfields that were discovered before 1988, and only 
10 per cent is from fields that were discovered in the 
1990s and 2000s.143 The rates of decline have increased 
considerably, reaching an annual level of 11 per cent.144 
In other words, Russia faces the huge challenge of 
overcoming production decline and replacing deplet-
ing fields with new ones. Besides enhanced oil recov- 
 
141  Henderson, Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Produc-
tion and Exports (see note 137), 1–2. 
142  Ekaterina Kravchenko, “Sankczii SSHA i ES mogut privesti 
k zakatu rossijskoj neftyanoj otrasli” [“US and EU Sanctions 
May Lead to the Collapse of Russian Oil Industry”], Vedomosti.ru, 
14 August 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/ 
32110451/neftyanoj-udar-po-byudzhetu (accessed 6 January 
2015). 
143  Deborah Gordon and Yevgen Sautin, Opportunities and 
Challenges Confronting Russian Oil (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 28 May 2013), http:// 
carnegieendowment.org/2013/05/28/opportunities-and-
challenges-confronting-russian-oil (accessed 23 October 2015). 
144  Global Trends 2013, ed. Lukoil, 45 and 46. 
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ery in brownfields and smaller satellite greenfields, 
new deposits have to be opened in more remote, geo-
logically and/or geographically difficult areas such as 
the Arctic shelf, non-conventional oil and bitumen 
oil. This implies geographical and geological as well 
as technological shifts, as oil production and refining 
will require modern equipment and technologies. 
This is seen as decisive in order to modernise and up-
date the hydrocarbon industry in Russia. Yet, under 
the current low price environment and the sanctions 
regime, it is not very likely that this will happen on 
a large scale. 
The development path will have repercussions for 
the environment and on the emission of greenhouse 
gases. Looked at from that angle, it makes a difference 
whether Russia taps into the Arctic, with its very sen-
sitive environment, or into its bitumen, kerogen or oil 
shale resources. In the past, Russian oil policies have 
incentivised exploration and production from diffi-
cult-to-extract and sometimes heavy, dirty oils.145 
Eighty-three per cent of the current oil balance is light 
sweet crude, 15 per cent heavy oil and 2 per cent extra-
heavy bitumen. But by 2020 heavy oil could double 
to 30 per cent and bitumen might increase to 20 per 
cent, resulting in a balance between equal shares of 
light and heavy oils.146 Heavy oils have fundamentally 
different physical and chemical compositions, which 
affect the refining process. As a consequence, these 
carbon-intensive oil reserves are much more difficult 
to handle and have more damaging and detrimental 
effects on the climate and the environment. 
Yet, Russia has larger tight oil reservoirs than the 
United States.147 Russia is more conventional in its 
“make-up” but non-conventional in production. Ac-
cording to a preliminary assessment, the Bazhenov 
formation in western Siberia148 has a potential be-
tween 35 billion tons and 403 billion tons. It is esti-
mated that the formation can produce high-quality 
light and sweet oil, but it also contains large amounts 
of kerogen oil.149 There are numerous obstacles that 
 
145  Gordon and Sautin, Opportunities and Challenges Confronting 
Russian Oil (see note 143). 
146  Ibid., 2. 
147  Bakken is the largest shale oil formation in the United 
States. 
148  “Russia’s Bakken”, Petroleum Economist, 4 February 2014,  
42–43, http://www.petroleum-economist.com/Article/3305251/ 
Russias-Bakken.html (accessed 23 October 2015). 
149  Kerogen or oil shale is immature oil contained in the source 
rock. Kerogen can be converted into marketable crude oil by 
heating the oil shale. 
will not allow for any significant oil production from 
this field in the medium term. Above all, the geologi-
cal conditions are different from those in the United 
States and are more complex150 because of its “lasagne 
structure”. In order to make oil production economi-
cally viable, multistage hydraulic fracturing technol-
ogy should be adapted to new conditions. A first pilot 
well drilled by GazpromNeft resulted in 80 cubic 
metres/day.151 
The record of shale oil development is patchy. The 
role of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing is 
rapidly increasing in Russia: in 2013, 42 per cent of 
new wells were drilled by GazpromNeft using hori-
zontal drilling, whereas in 2011 it only accounted for 
4 per cent. Although considerable progress in terms of 
shale oil development has been observed in Tatarstan, 
Western sanctions on these technologies will delay the 
projects by a minimum of 5–10 years.152 
Thus, neither the legal framework nor the tax sys-
tem is favourable for attracting innovation and for-
eign technologies or enhancing oil recovery rates. It is 
tailored to direct investments into particular sites of 
strategic interest, either in geological or geographical 
terms in the Far East or Far North. With the creation 
of the Eurasian Customs Union, Russia has slightly 
adapted its tax regime by harmonising export duties. 
Thereby, the export duties for naphta, diesel, gasoline, 
bitumen and mazout decrease substantially, whereas 
the tax burden for production increases. Subsidies for 
refineries have decreased. In sum, the law is beneficial 
for oil exporters (Rosneft, Lukoil, Tatneft) and is dis-
advantageous for producers, refineries and petrochemi-
cal manufactures. Moreover, the domestic price of 
crude and oil products will increase. 
Thus, the Russian oil industry is at a decisive point. 
As James Henderson153 analyses, the relation between 
 
150  Bazhenov geological conditions are considered to be quite 
difficult because of the heterogeneity of the cross sections, the 
sizeable deposit depths and the high temperatures as well as 
abnormal pressure zones. In addition, in-situ oil extraction in 
the United States occurs at the depth of 600 metres, whereas 
in the case of Bazhenov it should be 3,000 metres. 
151  “‘Gazprom Neft’ poluchila fontaniruyushhij pritok slancze-
voj nefti na novoj skvazhine” [“GazpromNeft Got a Gushing 
Shale Oil Inflow from the New Well”], GazpromNeft, 29 April 
2014, http://www.gazprom-neft.ru/press-center/news/1102042/ 
(accessed 6 January 2015). 
152  “Slanczevoye Zavtra Tatarstana” [“Shale Future of Tatar-
stan”], Tatcenter, 28 March 2014, http://info.tatcenter.ru/article/ 
134739/ (accessed 16 December 2014). 
153  Henderson, Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Produc-
tion and Exports (see note 137), 2–3. 
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hard currency earnings and hard currency versus 
rouble costs as well as the extent of government sup-
port for the industry will determine the investment 
decisions of Russian companies in a scenario of rela-
tively low oil prices. US and EU sanctions in the oil 
sector will delay projects in the Arctic as well as for 
deep-water and tight oil extraction, which would have 
been economically challenging anyway. In this en-
vironment, the major issues are brownfield develop-
ments and the opening of new greenfields. This is 
where sanctions have an impact on the ability to raise 
funding on the international capital markets (see the 
section below on “2014 and the impact of sanctions”). 
Enhanced oil recovery is a major way forward, as 
recovery rates in Russia are very low compared to 
other oil-producing areas. 
Old and New Export Destinations and the 
Competition over Market Shares 
For the global oil market, Russian crude and oil prod-
ucts, its transport routes and pipelines are important 
pillars of the global energy system. Any strategic shifts 
would imply new geostrategic challenges: shifting 
trade flows from the Middle East, more sea traffic 
through the sensitive Baltic Sea and increasing the 
importance of the northern sea route, especially for 
China. Besides, Russia will remain a main transit 
country for Caspian oil from Kazakhstan. 
Russia’s oil industry has been very export-orien-
tated because oil comprises only 21.8 per cent of the 
primary domestic energy supply (compared to 51.8 
per cent for natural gas).154 About three-quarters of 
Russian oil is earmarked for international markets 
(both as crude and refined products).155 In the midst 
of the current geopolitical crises and the sanctions, 
Russia faces increasing competition over market 
shares because of a surplus in global oil production. 
Russian exports have to be stepped up in Asia, which 
is the region with growth in demand. Demand for oil 
in the EU is stagnating. Moreover, with the current 
surplus of supplies on global oil markets, Russia has 
to compete with other suppliers such as the United 
States and Saudi Arabia. A major challenge will be 
whether Iranian supplies return to the market and 
 
154  International Energy Agency, Russia 2014. Energy Policies 
beyond IEA Countries (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-opera-
tion and Development/International Energy Agency, 2014), 17. 
155  Six, Russia’s Oil Export Strategy (see note 130), 15. 
in what quantities after the recent nuclear deal. The 
grade of Iranian crude is very similar to Russia’s Urals 
blend. Russian companies are trying to rapidly re-
direct its energy flows to Asia. In 2014, 30 per cent of 
Russian oil went to Asia and reached a record high: 
more than 1.2 mb/d (see Figures 10 and 11 for crude 
and products in million tons). At the same time, ex-
ports to Europe decreased from 3.72 mb/d in May 2012 
to 2.96 mb/d in July 2014 (see Figures 12 and 13).156 
Although a rebalancing eastwards has been expected 
with the takeover of TNK-BP by Rosneft and supply 
deals between Rosneft and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), nevertheless it is moving at an 
accelerated pace. 
As Figures 11 and 13 illustrate, the EU’s share in 
Russian crude oil exports is diminishing, whereas the 
share of exports directed to China is growing. Vice 
versa, the EU’s share in oil products is increasing, 
whereas the Chinese share is decreasing, given that 
new complexes are being built in Asia (see Figures 11 
and 13). Russia exports its Urals blend to Europe; it is 
a blend of Siberian light oil from western Siberia with 
heavy oils from the Urals-Volga region. As western 
Siberian oilfields are in decline, eastern Siberian oil-
fields – in particular Vankor – are becoming more 
important for future production growth. Medium-
light oil from eastern Siberia is being sent in increas-
ing volumes to China via the Eastern Siberia-Pacific 
Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. Chinese long-term investments 
have been directed into Russia over the past five years 
to connect the fields of eastern Siberia with the Chi-
nese market. Although in 2002 Khodorkovsky’s plans 
for Yukos to build a pipeline to China had generated 
resistance from the Russian elite and Transneft, which 
is the state transport monopoly – jointly with Rosneft 
– concluded an agreement with China in 2008 to co-
finance the ESPO pipeline. The pipeline is the longest 
pipeline in the world and has a capacity of 1–1.2 mb/d; 
one leg branches off in Skovorodino to China and a 
second to the Russian port of Kozmino.157 The deal in-
cluded long-term deliveries over 20 years of 15 million 
tons annually. First deliveries started in 2011. Between 
2008 and 2014, Russian crude exports to China more 
 
156  Eric Yep, “More Russian Oil Flows East as Relations with 
West Sour”, wsj.com, 14 August 2014, http://online.wsj.com/ 
articles/russian-oil-flows-east-as-relations-with-west-sour-
1408020141 (accessed 16 December 2014). 
157  Russia: International Energy Data and Analysis, EIA, http://www. 
eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=RUS (accessed 24 
August 2015). 
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Figure 10 
Russian Federation: Crude oil and oil product exports 
to EU-28 (volume, mln. tons) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade, 
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647 167524::NO. 
Figure 11 
Russian Federation: Share of crude oil and oil product 
exports to EU-28 (in %) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade, 
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647167524::NO. 
Figure 12 
Russian Federation: Crude oil and oil product exports 
to China (volume, mln. tons) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade, 
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647167524::NO. 
Figure 13 
Russian Federation: Share of total crude oil and oil 
product exports to China (in %) 
HS Code 2709, 2710. 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade, 
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647167524::NO. 
than doubled. In the first eight months of 2015, Russia 
had increased its oil exports to China by 28 per cent. 
Expected growth of future demand for oil in China 
and India contrasts strongly with declining demand 
for oil in Europe. Thus, Russia intends to again double 
its Asian oil exports, which currently account for 28 
per cent of total exports.158 China has taken a very 
strategic approach to secure Russian supplies to its 
heartland because it aims to reduce its dependence 
on the Middle East. Russia, in turn, intends to become 
strongly dependent on a single market by pushing 
 
158  Ibid. 
forward additional supply contracts with China.159 
China has secured the volumes through pre-payment 
or pre-credits, as they have been linked to “loan for 
oil” or “oil for export” schemes. Thus, Russia has com-
mitted itself to supply around 600,000 b/d to China 
for the next 25 years.160 
A major consequence for Europe of the Russian 
pivot to Asia could be the deterioration of the quality 
of oil delivered to Europe, as Russia has promised to 
supply light sweet crude from western Siberia to China. 
The quality of the Urals blend crude oil for the Euro-
 
159  Six, Russia’s Oil Export Strategy (see note 130), 19–22. 
160  Ibid., 22. 
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Table 6 
Oil refinery Output by selected company (without international projects), million tons 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Rosneft  49.8  50.5  50.65  50.9  81.3  86.6 
Lukoil  44.4  45.2  45.2  44.4  45.2  45.3 
GazpromNeft  31.0  35.0  38.0  39.2  38.8  39.6 
Bashneft  20.7  21.2  21.1  20.8  21.4  21.7 
Surgutneftegaz  19.5  20.3  20.1  19.6  18.9  19.3 
Slavneft  13.6  14.3  14.8  15.3  15.1  15.3 
Tatneft  n/a  2.2  7.2  7.4  7.6  8.5 
Russneft  5.0  5.1  5.2  5.8  5.8  8.0 
Source: Companies’ annual reports. 
 
pean consumer will deteriorate, as crude from the 
Baltic and the Black Sea contains more sulphur.161 In-
creased levels of export commitments to China have 
already led to the redirection of some crude from west-
ern Siberia initially destined for Europe into the ESPO 
pipeline system. Moreover, to fulfil its commitments, 
Russia has asked Kazakhstan to supply additional vol-
umes to the ESPO pipeline, which might also redirect 
certain volumes away from Europe.162 Furthermore, 
in February 2015 the Ministry for Energy entrusted 
Transneft to work out a project on allocation of sour 
crude oil through a separate export destination via 
Ust-Uluga. As a result, a new blend of sour crude oil 
can be created in Russia similar to Iraq’s Kirkuk and 
Basrah blends, 23 million tons of which could be ex-
ported per year. Indeed, the share of sour crude oil of 
Transneft’s total exports increased from 77.5 million 
tons in 2013 to 81.1 million tons in 2014.163 According 
to the European Commission, sour crude oil imports 
amounted to 14 per cent of total EU oil imports in 
2013. At the same time, according to the International 
Energy Agency (IEA), oil consumption in the EU will 
decline and sour crude will sink at the fastest rate. 
Therefore, for the share of sour oil on the European 
market, Russia will have to compete with Saudi Arabia, 
Iraq and possibly Iran. In addition, when buying sour 
oil, companies demand substantial discounts that 
average US$52.7 per ton. 
The main winner will be China, which will be able 
to diversify its supplies and reduce its dependence on 
 
161  Ibid. 
162  Ibid. 
163  “‘Transneft’: v RF mozhet poyavit’sya novy’j sort nefti” 
[“Transneft: A New Oil Blend Might Appear in Russia”], tass.ru, 
18 February 2015, http://tass.ru/ekonomika/1776168 (accessed 
10 September 2015). 
the Middle East. Europe will remain the key market 
for Russia, according to the IEA. However, the share 
of oil exports to Europe will drop from 65 per cent in 
2013 to 54 per cent in 2019.164 
At Stake: Modernisation in the 
Russian Refinery Sector 
The Russian refinery sector has the third-largest capac-
ity in the world. Yet, Russia has simple, medium and 
complex refineries, with simple refineries having a 
negative free cash flow and the medium ones strug-
gling, too.165 An upgrading of refineries in Russia had 
already slowly begun before the crisis. This has to be 
done against the background of a rapidly changing 
global refinery landscape. Due to the light tight oil 
revolution in the United States, North American refin-
eries have become very competitive again, and new 
refinery complexes are being built in Asia and the 
Middle East. The current situation is putting pressure 
on an already struggling sector in Europe, but also on 
Russian refineries. Over the past 18 months, margins 
in Europe have recovered from the oil price slump, 
but this might just be a pause. Fierce competition over 
market shares is taking place. Against this background, 
Russian refineries have had to adapt, and a number 
of refineries have been put into operation. Production 
of diesel has been increasing in Russia in recent years, 
and in 2014 it achieved record output levels due to 
devaluation of the rouble and reductions on export 
 
164  Medium-Term Oil Market Report 2014, ed. IEA (Paris, 2014),  
119–120. 
165  Henderson, Key Determinants for the Future of Russian Oil Produc-
tion and Exports (see note 137), 44–48. 
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duties. An increasing number of Russian refineries are 
able to produce ultra-low sulphur diesel, putting Euro-
pean refineries under pressure.166 
Rosneft owns most of the refining capacity (see 
Table 5, p. 34); also among those are a majority of the 
simple, unprofitable refineries that are under threat 
from the tax manoeuvre. The costs for upgrading these 
assets is estimated at US$20 billion.167 With regard 
to low oil prices and the stretched financial situation, 
the company would have to spend less on upstream 
developments. Thus, the company is at a strategic 
point, as an upgrading of refineries would threaten 
Rosneft’s output. A closure of these refineries might 
even result in more crude exports from Russia.168 
A dual strategy by Russian oil companies is visible. 
On the one hand, Russian companies are aiming to 
modernise their more profitable assets in the domestic 
market to further increase refined product exports 
to Europe. On the other hand, Russian oil companies 
have been investing in European (and Chinese) refin-
eries in recent years. This is a prudent strategy to 
lock-in market shares and to deepen the value-chain. 
Ros neft, Lukoil and also Gunvor own refinery assets 
in Europe with a total refining capacity of 1 mb/d. 
Through its share in Ruhr Oel, Rosneft owns stakes in 
four refineries in Germany (Gelsenkirchen, Bayernoil, 
MiRO and Schwedt) and has the net share of the 11.6 
million tons per year (233,000 b/d), which represents 
about 20 per cent of total refining capacity in Germa-
ny.169 In June 2015, BP and Rosneft agreed on a reorga-
nisation of its joint venture, Ruhr Oel, and on an asset 
swap that would – as soon as the deal is approved 
by regulatory authorities – double Rosneft’s stakes in 
Bayernoil, MiRO and Schwedt. BP would have full 
ownership of Gelsenkirchen. Rosneft also has a stake 
in Italian Saras. Lukoil owns refineries in Romania 
(Ploiesti), Bulgaria (Burgas), Italy (ISAB) and it also has 
a stake in the Total refinery in the Netherlands (Vlis-
singen). The total refining capacity accounts for 31.8 
million tons per year (638,600 b/d).170 Finally, Gunvor 
owns two refineries in Germany (Ingolstadt), with a 
 
166  Six, Russia’s Oil Export Strategy (see note 130), 35. 
167  See in more detail: Henderson, Key Determinants for the Future 
of Russian Oil Production and Exports (see note 137), 46. 
168  Ibid. 
169  Rosneft: Acquisition of a Stake in Ruhr Oel GmbH, http://www. 
rosneft.com/Downstream/refining/Ruhr_Oel_GmbH/ (accessed 
9 September 2015). 
170  Lukoil: Refineries, http://www.lukoil.ru/static_6_5id_257_.html 
(accessed 9 September 2015). 
capacity of 100,000 b/d, and the Independent Belgian 
Refinery, with a capacity of 107,500 b/d.171 
Russian oil companies have been interested in 
investing in the European refinery sector for differ-
ent reasons. Firstly, due to a recent relative decrease 
in export duties for oil, the supply from refineries 
with the Urals blend from the Druzhba pipeline has 
become even more profitable. Secondly, European 
refineries have higher levels of efficiency in compari-
son to Russian ones, and investments to upgrade Euro-
pean refineries could be more profitable with quicker 
payoffs. Finally, such a strategy has given downstream 
access in Europe to Russian companies and locks-in 
market shares for Russian crude exports. 
The message for Europe is mixed: Due to increasing 
environmental standards and the demand structure 
(primarily in the EU), lighter, less carbon-intensive and 
cleaner petroleum products pose a challenge to the 
Russian refinery sector. This is particularly true for 
the EU’s Euro 5 and Euro 6 standards for cars and light 
commercial vehicles.172 Plummeting oil prices have 
different impacts on Russian and European refineries: 
With low oil prices, margins decrease for Russian refin-
eries and increase for European ones.173 
2014 and the Impact of Sanctions 
The crisis in and around Ukraine has implications in 
the oil sector. First, Arctic and non-conventional oil 
production are affected by sanctions and being post-
poned and even cancelled. But these projects are un-
profitable in the current oil price environment any-
way. Against the background of rouble depreciation 
and the revaluation of debt in foreign currencies, 
Rosneft’s net profits decreased from US$5.7 billion 
in 2013 to US$5.13 billion in 2014.174 Whereas 2014 
proved to be a very profitable year for Rosneft, mostly 
 
171  Gunvor: Refineries, Gunvor, http://gunvorgroup.com/our-
assets/refineries/ (accessed 9 September 2015). 
172  See Regulation (EC) n° 692/2008 implementing and amending 
Regulation (EC) n° 715/2007 on type-approval of motor vehicles with 
respect to emissions from light passenger and commercial vehicles (Euro 5 
and Euro 6) and on access to vehicle repair and maintenance information. 
173  “Institutional Investors: Main Indicators”, Total, 2015, http:// 
www.total.com/en/investors/institutional-investors/main-
indicators (accessed20 November 2015). 
174  Sergey Smirnov and Galina Starinskaya, “Chisty’j dolg ‘Ros-
nefti’ vy’ros na tret’” [“Net Debt of ‘Rosneft’ Has Increased by 
One-third”], Vedomosti.ru, 4 March 2015, http://www. vedomosti. 
ru/business/articles/2015/03/04/rosneft-sokratila-pribil-v-2014-
godu (accessed 11 September 2015). 
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due to rouble devaluation and decrease in export 
duties, the financial situation in 2015 is becoming 
much more strained, in particular for Rosneft (but 
also for Gazprom). 
Russian companies need to generate financial 
resources, also due to low oil prices. Rosneft has the 
largest debts among Russian oil companies. The total 
net debt of Rosneft is US$43.8 billion.175 Rosneft paid 
the final tranche to BP for the acquisition of TNK-BP 
in February 2015. Rosneft is under significant pressure 
and aiming at generating more cash flow. Rosneft has 
looked into a number of methods to generate cash: 
1) prepayment for oil supplies, 2) money from the 
National Wealth Fund, 3) selling of shares in upstream 
projects and 4) selling of own equity. 
Thus, it signed a contract with China worth US$270 
billion – with US$70 billion in prepayment – to supply 
365 million tons of oil over 25 years.176 It has also sold 
to trading companies such as foremost Trafigura, but 
also Glencore, Vitol and Shell, which buy oil from Ros-
neft based on prepayment conditions. Despite these 
moves, the key problem of long-term investments for 
new projects remains unsolved. 
Therefore, Rosneft requested US$50 billion from 
the National Wealth Fund177 for refineries in the Far 
East and for the Arctic projects, then scaled it down 
to US$21.3 billion. In August 2015 President Putin 
decided not to give any money to Rosneft unless a 
feasible payoff plan could be presented that took oil 
prices of US$40–$45 per barrel into consideration. 
Rosneft is looking for additional money from the 
sale of a 15 per cent share of the stock of the Vankor 
oilfield to the Indian state company ONGC Videsh.178 
Vankor is Rosneft’s crown jewel, as it provides 11 per 
cent of Rosneft’s production and 4 per cent of overall 
 
175  “OAO NK ‘Rosneft’: Rezultaty‘ po MSFO za 12mes. 2014 g.” 
[“Rosneft: Results according to the IFRS for 12 Months of 2014”], 
Rosneft, 4 March 2015, 13, http://www.rosneft.ru/attach/0/12/99/ 
Rosneft_Q4_2014_IFRS_RUS.pdf (accessed 11 September 2015). 
176  Denis Pinchuk, “Rosneft to Double Oil Flows to China in $270 
Billion Deal”, Reuters.com, 21 June 2013, http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2013/06/21/us-rosneft-china-idUSBRE95K08820130621 
(accessed 11 September 2015). 
177  The main function of the National Wealth Fund is to sup-
port the Russian pension system. On 1 August 2015 the National 
Wealth Fund accounted for $74.56 billion, according to the 
Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, http://old.minfin. 
ru/en/nationalwealthfund/statistics/amount/index.php?id_4= 
5830 (accessed 20 August 2015). 
178  “Rosneft Agreed on Sale of 15 Percent in Vankorneft to 
ONGC Videsh”, Rosneft press releases, 4 September 2015, http:// 
www.rosneft.com/news/pressrelease/04092015.html (accessed 
15 December 2014). 
oil production in Russia. The next investor could 
be China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). 
Finally, ChemChina will get a majority stake in the 
Far-East Petrochemical Company (FEPCO).179 These are 
clear signs of pressure on the company, with the effect 
that Russian dependence on Asia is significantly in-
creasing. In December 2014, Medvedev approved the 
further privatisation of 19.75 per cent of Rosneft 
(equivalent to the share of BP in Rosneft).180 Potential 
buyers could be China or India. 
Last but not least, due to the sanctions, Western 
technology has to be replaced with domestic or Asian 
technologies. Russian companies are negotiating 
increasingly with Chinese providers, for example. 
Despite the pessimistic views expressed by Lukoil,181 
Asian equipment is increasingly being ordered in 
Russia: In 2014, 30 per cent of orders received by the 
Chinese Honghua group – a key provider of drilling 
technologies for Russia – came from Russian compa-
nies (up from 12 per cent before the Ukraine crisis). 
Rosneft is less exposed to technological risks than, for 
example, GazpromNeft because it developed its own 
services department. 
As an impact of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, the 
government proposed to facilitate access by foreign 
companies to Russian mineral, oil and gas fields, in-
creasing the share of foreign companies in projects 
from 25 per cent to 49 per cent, as of July 2014.182 And 
in September 2014, Rosneft and Gazprom lobbied for 
liberalisation of legislation, which would give foreign 
companies better access to a number of deposits.183 
 
179  “Rosneft and ChemChina Develop Cooperation”, Rosneft 
press releases, 3 September 2015, http://www.rosneft.com/news/ 
pressrelease/030920152.html (accessed 11 September 2015). 
180  Artem Filipenok, “Medvedev podpisal dokument o chastich-
noj privatizaczii ‘Rosnefti’” [“Medvedev Signed a Decree on Par-
tial Privatization of Rosneft”], RBC, 1 December 2014, http://top. 
rbc.ru/economics/01/12/2014/547beba3cbb20fc8c084d76e 
(accessed 11 September 2015). 
181  “Lukojl: oborudovanie dlya razrabotki trudnoj nefti nelzya 
zamenit’ kitajskimi” [“Lukoil: Extraction Technologies for Non-
conventional Oil Can Not Be Substituted with Chinese Ones”], 
Vedomosti.ru, 14 November 2014, http://www.vedomosti.ru/ 
companies/news/35987441/lukojl-oborudovanie-dlya-razrabotki-
trudnoj-nefti-nelzya (accessed 19 December 2014). 
182  Yuriy Barsukov, Kyrill Melnikov and Anatoliy Dzhumaylo, 
“Ot gosudarstva k gosudarstvu” [“From State to State”], Kommer-
sant.ru, 17 July 2014, http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2526785 
(accessed 15 December 2014). 
183  Galina Starinskaya and Mikhail Serov, “Rosneft i Gazprom 
podelyatsya shel’fom” [“Rosneft and Gazprom Will Share Their 
Shelf”], Vedomosti.ru, 25 September 2014, http://www.vedomosti. 
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Yet, this liberalisation targets predominantly com-
panies from China, India and the Middle East. 
Conclusions from a German and 
EU Perspective 
Europe should be cautious regarding the oil market. 
Russia is among the top two exporters in the world, 
and any developments in Russia regarding production 
and export will have very tangible effects on the world 
oil markets. Moreover, for Russian budget revenues, 
the oil sector is still a key income source. In the short 
term, crude oil exports from Russia will remain high 
because of the urgent need for foreign currency. 
Russia is a key country in terms of the current sup-
ply of crude and refined products. It is a key investor 
in the German and European refinery sector, whose 
profitability is closely linked to the supply of the Urals 
blend in many cases. It is foreseeable on a global scale 
that the surplus in refinery capacity will result in 
growing competition over the Asian and European 
markets. Russian oil companies aim to preserve their 
market share in Europe but are also expanding to 
Asia. One day in the future, Rosneft might decide on 
the closure of its European outlets in favour of Russian 
locations, but this seems to be far off. Russia is aiming 
to modernise and deepen the value-added chain inside 
the country. Under current circumstances, Rosneft’s 
investment in German refineries might benefit both 
sides. 
Moreover, Russia is a major upstream partner for 
Western international oil companies. Thus, it should 
not be surprising that Western companies continue 
their business activities in Russia, where they are not 
affected by sanctions. These “multis” have been in-
creasingly under pressure, firstly, because 85–90 per 
cent of conventional fossil fuel reserves are controlled 
by national oil companies. Secondly, they had to shift 
their investments into more difficult geological, cli-
matic or geographic areas in order to maintain their 
reserves. These activities are less economically effi-
cient in times of a relatively low oil price. Therefore, 
the access to conventional and relatively cost-efficient 
reserves is essential for their capitalisation. In that 
respect, ever-closer cooperation between state com-
panies (e.g. Russian and Chinese) along the whole 
value-chain is a source of concern because it might 
 
ru/companies/news/33849021/rosneft-i-gazprom-podelyatsya-
shelfom (accessed 15 December 2014). 
reinforce “mercantilist approaches” to energy trade, 
with possible negative repercussions for free trade 
flows in times of narrow markets, but certainly with 
lost opportunities for the Western multinationals. 
Thirdly, the longer the crisis over Ukraine and the 
sanctions lasts, the more of an impact on investments 
in Russian upstream developments. This might re-
inforce the cyclical swings in oil markets, as the Inter-
national Energy Agency has already warned in its 
World Energy Outlook 2015 that investments are de-
creasing. Too little investment might easily result in 
high price spikes again. Equally, the longer the crisis 
lasts, the more that the mutual exposure to risks 
grows, both for European investors and also for Rus-
sian investors in the EU. 
To conclude, there are good reasons to build upon 
commercial ties to create mutual benefits. There is 
more interdependence in the oil sector than the super-
ficial view of a fungible and flexible global oil market 
suggests at first sight. Thus, any considerations of an 
oil import embargo as part of new sanctions184 should 
be seen as an “ultima ratio” in the field of economic 
sanctions, and not as a powerful instrument to achieve 
a policy shift in Russia. The effect on EU-Russian rela-
tions would be detrimental, as this would result in 
counter-sanctions and also destroy “last resorts” of 
cooperation niches deliberately exempted from the 
current sanctions in place. 
 
 
 
184  Roland Götz, “Zwischen Angst und Größenwahn. Gas und 
Öl als politische Druckmittel”, Osteuropa 64, no. 5–6 (2014):  
277–92. 
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Electricity, Renewables and Energy Efficiency – 
“Last Resorts” for Enhanced Energy Coopera-
tion between Russia and the EU? 
After the dissolution of Comecon and the Soviet 
Union, the interconnection of the electricity grids 
of the (post-) Soviet region and Europe’s Union for the 
Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) 
became an intriguing vision. The “Baltic Ring” was one 
of the early visions looking to bring together German 
companies such as the defunct PreussenElektra, Rus-
sia’s RAO EES Rossii and local generation companies 
in, for example, St. Petersburg and Kaliningrad. The 
broad vision was for common integrated electricity 
cooperation and electricity market development from 
the Atlantic to the Urals and beyond.185 
In the first decade of the 2000s, the optimism pre-
vailed because Russia had embarked on structural 
reforms in the electricity sector. It was hoped that the 
two markets would continue to converge as liberalisa-
tion and competition were introduced in Russia. Later 
on, the electricity sector and renewable energy genera-
tion plus efficiency were seen as offering opportuni-
ties for a modernisation partnership to decarbonise 
the energy system. The modernisation partnership 
was formulated by Germany in 2009 and the EU in 
2010 with Russia. The 2013 Roadmap for EU-Russia 
Energy Cooperation until 2050 indeed foresaw inter-
connected power systems and market couplings.186 
Russia exports electricity to Latvia, Lithuania, Fin-
land and Poland. With decreasing spot prices in the 
integrated Scandinavian Nord Pool Market, Russian 
electricity exports to Finland have been decreasing – a 
process that will most likely continue with Latvia and 
 
185  Anforderungen für ein integriertes Europa: Die deutsch-russische 
Kooperation im Elektrizitätssektor, SWP-Studie 424, ed. Andrei 
Kuxenko (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 
1998), and Rudolf Botzian, Andrei Kuxenko, Friedemann Müller 
and Klaus Schröder, Transformation und Globalisierungsdruck in Euro-
pa, Die Bedeutung der deutsch-russischen Kooperation im Elektrizitäts-
bereich, SWP-AP 3065 (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, April 1998). 
186  See EC, Roadmap: EU-Russia Energy Cooperation until 2050 (see 
note 5), 9. 
Lithuania as soon as they are directly connected to 
“Nord Pool” (see Figures 14 and 15, p. 45). 
One major field of cooperation should not be for-
gotten: One of the four thematic groups in the frame-
work of the Russia-EU energy dialogue187 has focussed 
on nuclear energy; at the last meeting in 2013, stress 
tests for nuclear power plants in Russia and the EU 
were discussed.188 In addition, cooperation in the 
sphere of nuclear energy has been discussed regularly 
within the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly between the 
State Duma and the European Parliament.189 The EU 
indeed depends considerably on Russia in the sphere 
of nuclear energy. 
Firstly, the EU has 18 nuclear reactors originating 
from Russia: Bulgaria (2), Czech Republic (6), Finland 
(2), Hungary (4) and Slovakia (4, with two more being 
built).190 These reactors provide 50 per cent of all elec-
tricity in Slovakia191 and more than one-third192 in 
Hungary. Typically, fuel rods are produced specifically 
for a certain model of reactor, as nuclear reactors are 
designed to run on very specific kinds of fuel rods, 
which cannot be replaced easily and without signifi-
cant risks. Re-engineering either the reactors or fuel 
 
187  “Sotrudnichestvo s ES” [“Cooperation with the EU”], Minis-
try of Energy of the Russian Federation, http://www.minenergo. 
gov.ru/activity/co-operation/russia_eu/ (accessed 16 September 
2015). 
188  “Sostoyalos’ zasedanie tematicheskoj gruppy’ po atomnoj 
e’nergetike Rossiya-ES (Sankt Peterburg)” [“Meeting of the The-
matic Group on Nuclear Energy Has Taken Place in St. Peters-
burg”], Presidential Council on Economy Modernization and 
Innovative Development, 23 June 2013, http://www.i-russia.ru/ 
nuclear/news/19242/ (accessed 16 September 2015). 
189  “Itogovy’j dokument pyatogo zasedaniya mezhparlaments-
koj gruppy’ Rossija-ES po e’nergetike” [“Fifth Meeting of the 
Inter-Parliamentary EU-Russia Group on Energy: Final Docu-
ment”], 22–23 April 2014, http://www.ruscable.ru/other/ɋɤɚɧ%20 
ɂɬɨɝɨɜɨɝɨ%20ɞɨɤɭɦɟɧɬɚ.pdf (accessed 16 September 2015). 
190  “Nuclear Power in the EU”, World Nuclear Association, 24 July 
2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/Others/ 
European-Union/ (accessed 16 September 2015). 
191  “Nuclear Power in Slovakia”, World Nuclear Association, 
August 2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ 
Countries-O-S/Slovakia/ (accessed 16 August 2015). 
192  “Nuclear Power in Hungary”, World Nuclear Association, 
April 2015, http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/ 
Countries-G-N/Hungary/ (accessed 16 September 2015). 
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Figure 14 
Russian Federation: Electrical Energy exports to EU-28 (millions of kilowatt hours) 
HS Code 2716. 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade,  
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647167524::NO. 
Figure 15 
Russian Federation: Share of total electrical energy exports to EU-28 (in %) 
HS Code 2716. 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade,  
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647167524::NO. 
 
rods is possible but requires significant investments. 
Thus, Russian companies TVEL and Tenex – owned by 
100 per cent state-owned company Atomenergoprom – 
produce fuel for Russian reactors. In 2014, the share 
of the EU’s uranium supplies from Russia was 18 per 
cent193 and uranium enrichment services 25 per cent.194 
 
193  “Purchases of Natural Uranium by EU Utilities by Origin, 
1992–2014 (tU)”, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
euratom/observatory_data.html (accessed 16 September 2015). 
194  “Providers of Enrichment Services Delivered to EU Utilities, 
1993–2014 (tSWU)”, European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
euratom/observatory_data.html (accessed 16 September 2015). 
Regarding the electricity sector, major questions 
arise: 
1) Are reforms in the electricity sector continuing? 
Is competition increasing in generation, but also 
on the wholesale and retail levels? 
2) How has the legal and regulatory framework devel-
oped with respect to “modernisation”, and what are 
the strategic priorities for the Russian power sector? 
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Table 7 
Electricity production by company, from thermal power stations (billion kW/h) 
 Main stakeholder 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Inter RAO  Rosneftegas/ 
FSK/RusHydro 
 n/a  85.200  116.900  113.955  132.152  146.045
OGK-2  Gazprom  76.119  82.472  79.796  75.202  70.658  68.693
E.ON Russia E.ON   53.948  55.791  62.467  64.202  62.995  59.238
Mosenergo Gazprom  61.747  64.969  64.648  61.334  58.642  56.667
KES-Holding  Renova  63.270  64.969  61.400  58.423  56.540  58.400
Enel OGK-5 Enel  41.365  45.118  44.490  46.768  44.121  44.658
RAO Energy  
Systems of East 
RusHydro  26.900  27.563  30.368  31.563  30.002  31.155
Fortum Fortum  16.000  16.100  17.400  19.300  20.000  25.278
TGK-1 Gazprom  12.801  14.200  16.309  16.890  17.313  14.960
Eurosibenergo Rusal  13.8  15.056  12.800  18.414  15.100  12.500
Kvadra Oneximgroup  10.674  11.146  11.207  11.214  11.457  10.470
Note: Electricity mix 2013: thermal power – 66.4 per cent; hydro – 17.1 per cent;  
nuclear – 16.5 per cent. Electricity produced in 2013 – 1050.7 billion kW/h. 
Source: Annual reports, RIA rankings. 
 
Structural Reforms and Priorities 
The signs for developing an ambitious reform of the 
electricity sector were promising and encompassed 
structural reforms.195 As a result of the Inter RAO UES 
reform from 2003 to 2008, the assets of the state’s 
vertically integrated electricity company were split 
between 21 independent companies. Nuclear power 
plants and grid monopolies remained under state 
control, whereas generating, sales and repair com-
panies were to be privatised and to compete with each 
other, and purportedly reduce costs. The privatisation 
in 2008 brought some new entrants and greater diver-
sity to generation ownership. 
Yet, the reform has not led to the expected results. 
Firstly, efficiency and reliability of the sector have 
not increased. The “Moscow blackout” of 2005 and an 
accident at the Sayano-Shushenskaya hydroelectric 
power station in 2009 took place under this new sce-
nario. Secondly, the creation of a wholesale electricity 
market and the deregulation of prices for industrial 
consumers have not created the expected competition 
in the sector but have led to a sharp rise in electricity 
tariffs in the country. Within the last five years, prices 
 
195  See in more detail: Douglas Coke, Russian Electricity Reform 
2013 Update, Laying an Efficient and Competitive Foundation for Innova-
tion and Modernisation, IEA Insights Series 2013 (Paris: Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development/International 
Energy Agency, 2013). 
have more than doubled. Thirdly, getting connected 
to the grid in Russia requires one of the longest – and 
most expensive – waiting periods in comparison with 
other countries. Finally, newcomers to the sector tried 
to maximise profits with minimal investments. As a 
result, the investment programme proposed by the 
government failed.196 A looming structural problem is 
evident: The delayed renovations of the infrastructure 
require huge investments that cannot be easily financed 
or amortised through higher tariffs. 
Two conflicting approaches in the government 
became evident: The first one is the so-called liberal 
approach, proposed by Prime Minister Medvedev, 
which was assumed to bring initially planned reforms 
to an end and establish a free-market by eliminating 
local monopolies and cross-subsidies. In contrast, 
Sechin, Head of Presidential Commission (and Ros-
neft), lobbied for strengthening the state’s influence 
in the electricity sector. Supporters of that approach 
assumed that this will increase the controllability of 
the electricity sector. As a consequence, state-owned 
companies such as RusHydro, Gazpromenergoholding, 
Rosatom and Inter RAO UES have leading positions in 
the electricity sector (about 55 per cent of total genera-
tion). The government has continued to consolidate its 
 
196  Yuriy Borovsky, “Privatization of Russian Energy Assets in 
the International Context”, in: Vestnik MGIMO (Moscow: MGIMO 
University, 2013), 242–250. 
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assets through state-controlled companies such as Ros-
neftegas and Gazprom.197 Thus, presently Gazprom is 
the largest owner of electricity assets in Russia (con-
trolling stakes in Mosenergo, TGK-1 and OGK-2) and 
is among the top 10 world producers of electricity.198 
Moreover, key grid assets are reconsolidated within 
one state-owned company controlling approximately 
70 per cent of distribution and 90 per cent of trans-
mission grids in Russia.199 Again, the major figures of 
the energy and political elite are engaged in the elec-
tricity sector as well: most prominently Igor Sechin 
and Alexei Miller. RusHydro has seen changes in man-
agement because of a corruption crisis that enfolded 
in 2013. 
Rosatom is a state-owned non-profit company 
headed by Sergei Kirienko, a known pro-Western 
reformer and prime minister under President Yeltsin. 
Rosatom is also fulfilling international obligations in 
the field of the peaceful use of atomic energy. Rosatom 
is the number one global player with regard to con-
struction of nuclear power plants and the global nu-
clear fuel market; number two regarding installed 
capacity and uranium reserves; and number three 
in uranium extraction. Most importantly though, in 
strategic terms, is the fact that it is the only company 
that can provide the entire cycle of nuclear services.200 
The electricity sector has been a major field for 
investments of European companies such as German 
E.ON and Finish Fortum. This has been closely related 
to the high hopes of a close partnership. Under the 
new circumstances, though, increasing cooperation 
with Chinese companies can be observed: In Novem-
 
197  For example, Inter RAO sold 40 per cent of IrkutskEnergo to 
Rosneftegas at the beginning of 2013. In August 2013 Gazprom 
Energy bought 89.97 per cent of the Moscow United Energy Com-
pany (MOEK), which until now has been the only major company 
left in the hands of the state since the reorganisation of RAO 
UES; “Gazprom Bought Moscow United Energy Company”, Oil-
capital.ru, 13 August 2013, http://www.oilcapital.ru/company/ 
216474.html (accessed 16 December 2014). MOEK is the exclusive 
provider of heat to the population and companies in Moscow. 
198  See Gazprom, “Strategiya v oblasti e’nergetiki” [“Strategy in 
the Electricity Sector”], http://www.gazprom.ru/about/strategy/ 
energetics/ (accessed 16 December 2014). 
199  “Otchet o soczial’noj otvetstvennosti i korporativnom ustoj-
chivom razvitii” [“Report on Social Responsibility and Corporate 
Sustainable Development”], Rosseti2013, 7, http://www.rosseti.ru/ 
investors/info/sotsialnyy_otchet/doc/rosseti_sr_2013_rus_01-07-
2014-2.pdf (accessed 16 December 2014). 
200  Reiner Gatermann, “Rosatom’s Strategy: No Politics – 
More Openness”, European Energy Review, 8 July 2015, http://www. 
europeanenergyreview.eu/rosatoms-strategy-no-politics-more-
openness/ (accessed 8 July 2015). 
ber 2014 RusHydro signed two framework agreements 
with Chinese companies to build power stations and 
export electricity to China. The first deal was with 
Sanxia (Three Gorges Corporation) to construct a hydro 
power plant in the Amur and Khabarovsk regions. Chi-
nese partners promised to find themselves potential 
clients in China who would buy electricity. PowerChina 
has a project in the Leningrad region. A subsidiary of 
RusHydro – Energy Systems of the East – signed an 
agreement with Dongfang Electric International to 
build a hydro power station in Vladivostok and has 
proposed more joint ventures with Chinese compa-
nies.201 These are long-term developments; however, 
electricity exports to China have increased already in 
absolute volumes and relative terms (see Figures 16 
and 17, p. 48). 
Finally, against the background of economic sanc-
tions, the goal of having the electricity sector integrate 
into the world energy system202 has been abandoned 
in favour of further integration within the Eurasian 
Economic Union. A shift has also become visible in 
terms of the Russian electricity market’s interconnec-
tivity (and integration) with other systems when the 
Energy Strategy 2030 is compared with the new one 
for 2035: “gradual liberalization of domestic energy 
markets”203 is listed in the Energy Strategy as one of 
the measures of the state energy policy to achieve 
strategic goals on the domestic energy market. This 
is replaced in the new strategy with “integration of 
internal energy markets in the framework of the 
Eurasian Economic Union”,204 which is perceived as a 
main driver for flexibility of supply and an increase 
in competition among producers. So far, the design of 
the electricity market’s integration into the Eurasian 
Economic Union is still under discussion. However, 
 
201  “With Minus”, Exploration and Production Journal 6, no. 45 
(2014): 40–45. 
202  “Development of Domestic Energy Markets”, in Energy 
Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030, approved by Decree 
No 1715-r of the Government of the Russian Federation dated 
13 November 2009 (Moscow, 2010), 38, http://www.energystrategy. 
ru/projects/docs/ES-2030_(Eng).pdf (accessed 14 September 2015). 
203  “Current Results of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the 
Period up to 2020 Implementation, Objectives and Goals of the 
Strategy”, in Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2030, ibid., 
12. 
204  “Projekt: E’nergeticheskaya strategiya Rossii na period do 
2035” [“Draft Proposal of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the 
Period up to 2035: Implementation Mechanisms”], 24 August 
2015, http://minenergo.gov.ru/upload/iblock/43e/proekt-
energeticheskoy-strategii-rossii-na-period-do-2035.pdf (accessed 
15 October 2015). 
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Figure 16 
Russian Federation: Electrical energy exports to China (millions of kilowatt hours) 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade,  
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647167524::NO. 
Figure 17 
Russian Federation: Share of total electrical energy exports to China (in %) 
HS Code 2716. 
Source: Federal Customs Service, Customs Statistics of Foreign Trade,  
http://stat.customs.ru/apex/f?p=201:7:2921546647167524::NO. 
 
the discussions indicate that there will be a single 
tariff on the high-voltage distribution grids and a state 
monopoly on the electricity grid will persist.205 More-
over, the Minister of Energy of the Eurasian Economic 
Union, Tair Mansurov, refers to the example of Central 
and Western Europe electricity markets as prototypes 
for the future energy market of the Eurasian Economic 
Union.206 Yet, creating such a market would imply 
 
205  “Konczepcziya formirovaniya obshhego e’lektroe’nergeti-
cheskogo ry’nka Evrazijskogo e’konomicheskogo soyuza” [“Con-
cept for Forming a Common Electric Power Market of the Union”], 
approved by Decree N16 of the Eurasian Economic Commission 
Council dated 8 May 2015, Moscow, 2015: 15–16, http://bit.ly/ 
1OBAqKt (accessed 12 October 2015). 
206  T. Mansurov, “Sozdanie obshix ry’nkov e’nergoresursov poz-
volit EAE’S utverditsya na novoj mirovoj karte e’nergory’nkov v 
that Russia must eliminate cross-subsidies. The elec-
tricity market in Russia is a dual market, with regu-
lated tariffs for private households and non-regulated 
tariffs in the wholesale segment (with some excep-
tions). The wholesale market is divided into price 
zones: competitive areas (Europe, Urals and Siberia), 
non-competitive areas (Far East, Komi, Arkhangelsk, 
Kaliningrad) and isolated areas (Sakhalin, Kamchatka). 
From this perspective, the intention to postpone 
the elimination of cross-subsidies in the energy sector 
– mentioned in the new energy strategy – indirectly 
 
kachestve odnogo iz oshovny’h igrokov” [“Creation of the Com-
mon Energy Markets Will Enable the European Energy Union to 
Strengthen Its Position as a Major Player on the Global Map of 
Energy Markets”], Energorinok, 2015: 7–8, http://bit.ly/1ThAsbr. 
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confirms that liberalisation in the electricity sector 
will not be on the agenda, at least in the short- to 
medium term. It is important to emphasise that the 
current model of the wholesale and retail electricity 
markets is still in transition and is not able to fully 
ensure competition on the market and attract inves-
tors to the electricity sector. Setting the issue of future 
electricity market reforms aside in the new Russian 
Energy Strategy till 2035 only temporarily removes 
the issue from the agenda. 
Russian Policies on Renewable Energy and 
Energy Efficiency 
The backlash to structural reforms has implications 
for the integration of renewable energy and energy-
efficiency measures. The new package of measures to 
support renewable energy in Russia was adopted in 
May 2013. It faced strong opposition from the Union 
of Electricity Consumers and the Council of Electricity 
Producers, but was pushed by state companies: The 
renewable energy lobby is officially represented by 
Composit Holding, which is a partner of Rosatom, 
Rosnano and Rostechnologies. 
The new law establishes several important mecha-
nisms, such as capacity delivery agreements, which 
make renewable energy projects profitable and guar-
antee payoffs. Total capacity-input based on renew-
ables should be 5,871 megawatts (MW) by 2020, which 
is equivalent to 2.5 per cent of the total Russian energy 
mix,207 well below the target of 4.5 per cent by 2020 
once set by then-President Medvedev. A positive trend 
is not evident. Firstly, the government decided to sup-
port only solar, wind and hydro energy projects. All 
other sources that have considerable potential for 
development (most evidently biogas) are excluded from 
the government programme. Secondly, any project 
that intends to acquire the government’s support for 
the construction of generating capacities based on 
renewables should meet the criteria of so-called “local 
content” regulation.208 The provision of local content 
 
207  Damir Kasarin, “‘Mery’ podderzhki VIE’ v ramkax EE’S 
Rossii” [“Measures to Support Renewable Energy in Russia, 
UNDP in Russia”], http://solex-un.ru/energo/klyuchevye-temy/ 
vozobnovlyaemye-istochniki-energii/mery-podderzhki-vie 
(accessed 16 December 2014). 
208  The Russian government might be forced to reconsider the 
local content requirement, as it does not correspond to WTO 
norms. In May 2013 the Appellate Body of the WTO decided that 
current local content requirement for renewable energy in Cana-
requires that any project should use a certain amount 
of equipment produced in Russia. Thus, for example, 
in order to obtain government support for the projects 
based on wind energy, the share of Russian-produced 
equipment and components should be 35 per cent 
in 2014 and 65 per cent from 2016 to 2020. For solar 
equipment and components, it is 50 per cent in the 
2014–2015 period and 70 per cent from 2016 to 2020.209 
At present, the biggest and only producer of solar 
panels in Russia is Hevel Solar, established by Renova 
(51 per cent) of Viktor Vekselberg, and Rosnano (49 per 
cent) of Anatoliy Chubais. Production capacities of 
Hevel are estimated at 100 MW in 2013210 and 130 MW 
in 2014, whereas all other Russian producers have 
capacities only for 10 MW total. 
This illustrates a very protectionist approach, de 
facto resulting in a monopolisation of the renewable 
energy sector for solar and wind. The Russian business 
community will buy the solar equipment produced 
by Hevel because it guarantees profits and low levels 
of risk. Composit Holding will be the key producer of 
wind components. 
In early 2015, Prime Minister Medvedev signed a 
decree211 of the Government of the Russian Federation 
that provides support for electricity generation from 
renewable energy sources on the retail electricity mar-
kets, including those in isolated and remote areas, 
where the use of renewable energy is more cost-effec-
tive than expensive diesel generation. Thus, for the 
first time, the retail electricity market has been 
divided into a central market and isolated and remote 
markets. For example, isolated and remote power sys-
tems have been exempted from the requirements of 
local content regulation. Moreover, the decree pro-
vides support for all kinds of renewable energy, in-
cluding biogas, biomass and landfill gas. This is a 
 
da, Ontario, contradicts the agreement on trade-related invest-
ment measures. For more information see: Anatole Boute, “‘Zele-
naya’ e’nergetika v Rossii” [“Green Energy in Russia”], Russian In-
ternational Affairs Council, 18 March 2014, http://russiancouncil. 
ru/inner/?id_4=3327#top (accessed 6 January 2014). 
209  Kasarin, “Measures to Support Renewable Energy in Russia” 
(see note 207). 
210  See Hevel official website, http://www.hevelsolar.com/ 
production/modul/index.php (accessed 16 December 2014). 
211  “O stimulirovanii ispol’zovaniya vozobnovlyaemy’x istoch-
nikov e’nergii na roznichny’x ry’nkax e’lektroenergii” [“On In-
centives to Use Renewable Energy Sources on the Retail Electrici-
ty Markets”], approved by Decree N 47 of the Russian Federation 
dated 23 January 2015, http://government.ru/docs/16633/ 
(accessed 16 September 2015). 
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potential hook for the cooperation of European com-
panies with Russian regions, provinces and oblasts. 
Another promising area of cooperation has been 
energy efficiency. The enactment of the federal law on 
energy efficiency in 2009 under Medvedev’s presiden-
cy gave considerable impetus to the development of 
the legislative framework on energy efficiency in Rus-
sia. Following passage of the law, a state programme 
on energy savings was adopted. Positive results be-
tween 2008 and 2011 were achieved only in sectors 
such as state-funded organisations and residential 
buildings, lighting, appliances and equipment. In 
industry and transport, government measures were 
very limited and did not bring tangible results. Then, 
the adoption in April 2014 of a new state programme, 
“Energy Efficiency and Energy Development”,212 abol-
ished the previous programme and all established 
indicators to be achieved. The new programme only 
established indicative targets, such as a decrease in 
energy intensity of Russian GDP by 13.5 per cent com-
pared to the 2007 level, and an increase in oil refining 
efficiency up to 85 per cent.213 The new programme is 
less detailed and specific in terms of objectives, tools 
and the results. This might be a reaction to the ineffi-
cient policy on energy savings over the past four to 
five years as well as to a bad economic situation. How-
ever, the draft of the new Energy Strategy up to 2035 
clearly indicates that energy efficiency will be among 
the priorities in the energy sector. The new strategy 
offers more effective tools for stimulating policies on 
energy saving, more precisely: state guarantees for 
loans on the implementation of energy-efficiency proj-
ects; tax incentives for the purchase of new energy-
efficient technologies; development of market mecha-
nisms and target contracts; development of standards 
and labelling of buildings; equipment and vehicles; 
contract system of state purchases.214 
Yet, another positive step forward is the abolition of 
taxes on the import of electric cars from February 2014 
till the end of 2015.215 Furthermore, in August 2015, 
 
212  “Ob utverzhdenii gosudarstvennoj programmy’ Rossijskoj 
Federaczii ‘E’nergoe’ffektivnost’ i razvitie e’nergetiki” [“State Pro-
gram of the Russian Federation: Energy Efficiency and Energy De-
velopment”], approved by Decree N 321 of the Government of the 
Russian Federation dated 15 April 2014, RG.ru, http://www.rg.ru/ 
2014/04/24/energetika-site-dok.html (accessed 16 September 2015). 
213  Ibid., 3. 
214  “Energy Savings and Energy Efficiency”, in “Draft Proposal 
of the Energy Strategy of Russia for the Period up to 2035” (see 
note 204). 
215  Alina Raspopova, “Avtomobilistam obnulili schet za e’lektri-
chestvo. V Rossii na dva goda otmeneny’ vvozny’ye poshliny’ na 
Medvedev signed a decree allowing for the equipping 
of fuel stations with chargers for electric vehicles.216 
Conclusions from a German and 
EU Perspective 
In sum, the electricity sector, which has always been 
perceived as the “frontrunner” of liberalisation in 
Russia, is experiencing significant backlash. Still, the 
electricity sector remains a major prospective field 
for joint projects. With that, it should not be forgotten 
that Germany and the EU on the one hand and Russia 
on the other hand use very different framing. Whereas 
Germany in particular promotes decarbonisation, for 
Russia innovation and technological developments are 
the key motivations. 
The analysis identifies some anchors for coopera-
tion, for example in the field of decentralised renew-
able energies. Beyond that, however, the support 
schemes limit market access for foreign technologies. 
The nuclear sector is strategic for Russia to main-
tain its status as an “energy superpower”. Rosatom is 
among the three leading global players. Moreover, the 
threats stemming from nuclear technologies should 
be an incentive to continue cooperation with Russia 
in that realm (e.g. with the stress tests). In that respect, 
it is a quite sensitive move that the EU is funding the 
diversification of reactor fuel-supply for 28 Russian-
type units in the EU, which could impede future co-
operation and trust-building in that area.217 
 
 
 
e’lektromobili” [“Motorists’ Electricity Check Set at Zero. Import 
Taxes for Electric Cars in Russia Have Been Abolished for Two 
Years”], gazeta.ru, 23 December 2013, http://www.gazeta.ru/auto/ 
2013/12/23_a_5816565.shtml (accessed 16 December 2014). 
216  “Ob oborudovanii avtozapravochny’x stanczij zaryadny’mi 
kolonkami dlya transportny’x sredstv s e’lektrodvigatelyami” 
[“On Equipment of Filling Stations with Chargers for Vehicles 
with Electric Engines”], approved by Decree Nr. 890 of the Gov-
ernment of the Russian Federation dated 27 August 2015, http:// 
government.ru/docs/19447/ (accessed 16 September 2015). 
217  “EU Funds Diversification of Russian Reactor Fuel Supply”, 
world nuclear news (wnn), 29 June 2015, http://www.world-nuclear-
news.org/UF-EU-funds-diversification-of-Russian-reactor-fuel-
supply-29061501.html (accessed 29 June 2015). 
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Conclusions and Implications for German and EU Policies 
 
Dynamics in the EU-Russian Energy 
Relationship after Ukraine 
The analysis shows that all three sectors are closely 
interrelated between the EU and Russia and that the 
future carries risks and opportunities (for specific 
results and recommendations, see the respective con-
clusions). The impact of the annexation of Crimea and 
the hybrid warfare in Ukraine on bilateral energy 
relations between the EU and Russia has been severe. 
Geopolitics prevailed over economics between 2014 
and the spring of 2015. The security crisis in Eastern 
Europe has reinforced each side’s active diversification 
away from one another, the shift of Russian energy 
interests to the Pacific and the disputes over infra-
structure regulation in the EU. A political instrumen-
talisation of gas relations has obviously occurred on 
both sides (albeit not openly discussed by both sides): 
The EU Commission has not approved the compro-
mise on OPAL; it is reasonable to assume that Russia 
tried to complicate reverse flow from the EU into 
Ukraine over the course of the 2014/2015 winter period. 
Last but not least, EU sanctions tackled parts of the oil 
industry that might have been uneconomic anyway 
in times of relatively low oil prices. Yet, the latter – 
together with the financial sanctions – is having an 
influence on investment and refinancing strategies. 
The credit/prepayment deals lock in Russian export 
flows and create new alliances, in particular with 
Asian state companies. Russia is drifting more into 
the orbit of China’s “One belt, one road” initiative. The 
EU-Russian bilateral relationship is at a difficult point. 
The fact that this relatively short period has profoundly 
affected long-term relations is a warning sign and 
reveals many underlying problems that have accumu-
lated in the last decade. Russian energy diplomacy has 
shifted away from multilateral processes and engaged 
in becoming a balancing power while preserving most 
of its energy power. 
This is matched in the EU, where the deterioration 
of the political relationship in 2014 has resulted in a 
paradigm shift in energy relations. The crisis in and 
around Ukraine has prompted EU member states to 
rethink their (inter-) dependencies with Russia. Even 
in Germany, interdependence is viewed as a problem 
limiting the room for political manoeuvre and is no 
longer perceived as a foregone solution for an ever-
closer partnership with Russia. Yet, the securitisation 
of energy policy on both sides runs counter to eco-
nomic realities and commercial rationalities. 
This is taking place at a time when mere energy 
relations would require more dialogue, a balance of 
interests and an adaptation of demand-and-supply 
strategies. Business relations and commercial trans-
actions have become more complicated and potentially 
conflict-laden with bundled business across the whole 
value-chain being separated into its parts. Moreover, 
long-term orientation is being substituted by spot-
market and short-term logics in the EU internal mar-
ket. This adds an additional element of instability. 
An unprecedented level of uncertainty has become a 
dominant feature of the global energy system, but it 
has a special quality in the EU because of internal mar-
ket development and energy-transition projects such 
as the German “Energiewende”. 
Within the political framing, bilateral energy rela-
tions have been reduced to import and export depend-
encies, yet they reach far beyond that along the whole 
value chain. The activities of German and European 
companies in Russia are a fundamental asset, a base 
for their market position and capitalisation.218 Russian 
companies do have a strong foothold in, for example, 
German downstream gas markets, the refinery sector 
and (soon) upstream business in the North Sea. Rus-
sian companies have invested in segments of the ener-
gy sector where other commercial players have with-
drawn: refineries, gas transport and gas storage. These 
strategic Russian investments in sensitive areas carry 
specific geopolitical risks, in particular if the spirit of 
 
218  E.ON is one of the biggest buyers of Russian natural gas, but 
it is also the biggest investor in the Russian energy market, with 
cumulative investments of more than 10 billion euros. E.ON took 
over Russian power generation at OGK-4 in 2007 and has a gen-
eration capacity in Russia of more than 10 gigawatts. For BASF 
Wintershall, Russia accounts for more than 50 per cent of their 
hydrocarbon production and provide more than two-thirds of 
the company’s reserve base. Almost half of operating income is 
generated in Russia (Rainer Seele, BASF Oil & Gas [Roadshow Frank-
furt, 19 September 2014], Power Point Presentation, Slides 11 
and 12). 
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cooperation is also lost in economic transactions. Yet, 
they also have their value for the system and create 
long-standing connections and communication chan-
nels. 
Surprisingly, markets and prices have not reflected 
the geopolitical crisis. The final observation is that 
market reality does not match political “reality” and 
perceptions. A major reason is, of course, the com-
fortable gas supply and the surplus on oil markets. 
Exporters such as Russia are trying to – successfully – 
defend their market share in the EU. Yet, it is also a 
sign of a still valid, fundamental commercial logic 
of complementary consumer-producer relations, 
regional proximity and existing infrastructure. Recent 
moves indicate that economic rationality and com-
mercial interests are coming to the forefront again, 
which in fact means a rebalancing of economic inter-
ests versus political priorities. 
The St. Petersburg summit at the end of June 2015 
is a case in point: Firstly, this was the wished-for out-
come for President Putin, namely to signal Russia’s 
enduring attraction to foreign investors. Secondly, 
it reflected business interests. Thirdly, moving away 
from Russia as the low-cost source of gas is a demand-
ing commercial and political task. To summarise, there 
are sound reasons for maintaining close bilateral 
energy relations while at the same time diversifying 
towards new buyers (in the case of Russia) and sup-
pliers (in the case of the EU). 
Recommendations for German and 
EU Policies 
The factual arguments for a balanced, reformed and 
sustainable energy partnership between Germany/the 
EU and Russia are strong, as suggested by the analysis 
of all three major energy sectors. Five recommenda-
tions can be put forward. 
1) Be aware of negative spillovers. If energy trade 
and relations become more complicated, negative 
spillovers are very likely to occur in other policy areas. 
Non-dialogue and non-cooperation carry significant 
risks. Bilateral energy relations will not automatically 
continue so smoothly. Moreover, the impact of a de-
terioration in relations will only be visible 5 to 15 
years from now. The false sense of ongoing business-as-
usual should not lead astray. At the same time, smooth 
and expanded energy relations do not automatically 
guarantee positive effects for other policy areas in the 
current geopolitical situation. 
2) Manage interdependence and re-value commer-
cial activities. They are a value per se that strengthens 
the globalisation of energy trade and paves ways for 
balancing interests and enhancing economic coopera-
tion. The EU should pursue a more pragmatic approach 
that is grounded on projects. By creating successful 
projects, the two address the divergence over the key 
term of “interdependence”. The fact that Russia and 
the EU view interdependence differently has had pro-
found repercussions. Russia perceives it as creating 
joint ventures, infrastructure and asset swaps; the EU 
and Germany increasingly view it through the norma-
tive and regulatory lens and aim at a convergence of 
legal spaces (that would match with the liberal market 
paradigm of the EU). This has not happened and is un-
likely to be implemented anytime soon by Russia or 
other neighbouring regions. 
3) Normalise the relationship and set a de-securiti-
sation of the energy relationship in motion. Both sides 
are diversifying their portfolios anyway. This allows 
for facing the energy relationship in a more relaxed 
manner. Yet, it is indispensable to restart political 
dialogue on the working and technical levels (which 
implies “compartmentalising” Ukraine), and step-by-
step also on the political level. Germany and the EU 
have to address the qualitatively new situation with 
Russia and Russian companies. To that end, political 
channels such as the EU-Russian energy dialogue and 
the Gas Advisory Council should be revitalised as soon 
as possible. The focus should be on managing inter-
dependencies and diversification. There are more 
energy-security challenges ahead than Russia, e.g. in 
the Middle East, and Russian supplies are fundamen-
tal to global oil and gas markets. A normalisation will 
most likely dilute the “idealistic analogy” of Germa-
ny’s Ostpolitik and the gas-pipeline deals. Under the 
impact of the Ukraine crisis, the gap between political 
perceptions and market realities has been tremen-
dous. Bridging this gap of perceptions on Russia’s 
future role as an energy supplier to German and the 
EU is a real political challenge that demands a new 
framing of the energy relationship with Russia. This 
friction has to be bridged by defining technical, busi-
ness-orientated steps forward. 
4) Envision an energy future in the EU and then 
with Russia. Within the EU, the best way forward is an 
integrated and functioning internal market and a more 
sustainable energy system: If the EU wants to reduce 
its dependence on its major and “natural” fossil fuel 
supplier, the most logical step is to reduce dependence 
on fossil fuels themselves. This is sound in terms of 
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security of supply, but also with regard to environ-
mental and climate policies. Otherwise, the EU is 
accumulating the necessary resources for an energy 
transformation in measure to merely diversify, and 
thus simply shifting geopolitical risks. The Communi-
cation of the Energy Union219 is driven by the public 
goods of energy security and sustainability. The mar-
ket will not fully deliver to these ends; clear political 
goals and a stable regulatory environment are neces-
sary. Building infrastructure is key in order to achieve 
the level of security of supply, market integration and 
the transformation of the energy system that is politi-
cally desired. Diminishing uncertainty of demand 
by increasing the predictability of energy and climate 
policy is an important precondition to engage in a 
sustainable and solid relationship with external sup-
plies and to hedge against the risk of stranded assets 
in and for Russia. 
A minimal consensus on the way forward with 
energy policy in the EU would allow for identifying 
common projects with Russia in many areas. A politi-
cal commitment to use natural gas as a bridge to a 
low-carbon economy could be used to further engage 
in the “Blue Corridor” project to use compressed 
natural gas in transport and to use “power to gas” as 
a path into hydrogen and fuel cells. Methane leakage 
is another issue on which to work together. Last but 
not least, the emphasis on natural gas could help in 
finding a long-term arrangement for gas supplies from 
Russia (through Ukraine). The oil sector should remain 
a backbone of energy cooperation as long as oil re-
mains the major energy source in the mix, e.g. by 
addressing environmental standards and upgrading 
in refineries, and by discussing depletion paths to 
avoid a “carbon bubble”. The electricity sector and 
clean technologies certainly offer manifold opportuni-
ties, in particular with infrastructure modernisation, 
renewable energy and energy efficiency. Of strategic 
relevance for the future could be cooperation in nu-
clear safety and security, but also protection of critical 
cross-border infrastructure and cyber-security for vital 
energy interconnections. Technological cooperation, 
innovation and know-how transfer can serve to pro-
vide a long-term blueprint for a common future. 
5) Re-engage in energy diplomacy and shape exter-
nal energy relations. The EU and Russia face a mis-
match in their regulatory and legal gas-market ap-
 
219  European Commission, Energy Union Package. A Framework 
Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate 
Change Policy, COM (2015)80final, Brussels, 25 February 2015. 
proaches. This results from operational and technical 
processes related to the unbundling and market design, 
network codes and tariffs. Structural changes in the 
relationship have resulted in growing misperceptions, 
misunderstandings and increasing levels of mistrust. 
Change carries far-reaching risks, in particular in 
times of geopolitical tensions. Since 2009, the EU has 
relied increasingly on the Energy Community, which 
is important for the Balkan states, Ukraine, Moldova 
and Georgia. Yet, it exports the EU energy-related 
Acquis Communautaire to the neighbourhood and 
concentrates on regulatory and legal issues. This is not 
a substitute for an external energy diplomacy. Other 
integration projects such as the Silk Road initiative 
(“One belt, one road”) and the Eurasian Economic 
Union will challenge the EU closer to its own neigh-
bourhood with their paradigm of spaces shaped 
through interconnections and infrastructure, grounded 
on close state (company) cooperation. Therefore, the 
external dimension of the Energy Union has to be 
defined in a more inclusive and collective manner 
beyond the EU and towards Russia and other actors in 
the neighbourhood. The EU’s energy diplomacy has to 
adapt to this new situation, most likely by combining 
existing forums with loose, ad hoc consultation mecha-
nisms. It is important to find a way to discuss and 
develop principles, as in the Energy Charter Moderni-
zation Process 2 and the “International Energy Char-
ter”. Even though Russia is abstaining from it at the 
moment, such an inclusive approach is in particular 
essential with respect to the in-between neighbour-
hood, Central Asia and, last but not least, for energy 
relations in Eurasia. The Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s second dimension of 
economic cooperation might also be revived for the 
purpose. A “code of conduct” of energy relations with 
rules for energy trade, transit, investment and dispute 
settlement in Europe and Asia is desirable. 
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Abbreviations 
AGEB AG Energiebilanzen e.V. 
bcm billion cubic metres 
bcm/y billion cubic metres per year 
b/d barrels per day 
bn billion 
Comecon Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
EC European Commission 
ESPO Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (pipeline) 
EU European Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
IEA International Energy Agency 
kW/h kilowatt hour 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
mb/d million barrels per day 
mbtu million British thermal units 
MOEK Moscow United Energy Company 
MW megawatt 
NG Natural Gas 
OIES Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
OPAL Ostsee-Pipeline-Anbindungsleitung 
UGSS United Gas Supply System 
US$ US Dollar 
WTO World Trade Organization 
